The Hole in the Code: Good Faith and
Morality in Chapter 13

BRADLEY M. ELBEIN*

"I'm falling through a hole in the flag!
Help! I'm falling . ... "1
"For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain
the whole world, and lose his own soul? "2

Imagine an area of law defined by a comprehensive statute that courts
feel free to defy. Posit a body of legislative history were bent and
twisted in the furtherance of judicial interpretations which the plain
meaning of the law does not support. Envision a situation in which,
although the Supreme Court has signaled its preference that the plain
meaning of the statute govern, the courts ignore this judicial guidance.
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1. GEROME RAGNI AND JAMES RADo, HAIR (1966).
2. Mark 8:36 (King James).
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Imagine judicial interpretations of this statute which express the
presiding judges' personal moral values, not any legal principle grounded
in the statutory text. Envision a judicial determination that some persons
are not entitled to use the law, which on its face, was written for those
persons' benefit. Suppose that the courts were to begin to condemn the
very act of electing a statute and of complying with its provisions as an
"abuse" of the spirit of the statute.
These conditions would be seemingly inconceivable in the United
States. Yet the reader who has engaged in this exercise has not invoked
1984, the Spanish Inquisition, the Jim Crow laws, nor pre-apartheid
South Africa. She has envisioned the current status of a particular facet
of bankruptcy law in the United States.
A debtor faced with a catastrophic financial situation (e.g., a
professional3 threatened with malpractice liability) may chose to seek
protection in bankruptcy. A debtor finds several possible options in the
Bankruptcy Code.4 The Code offers different discharges from indebtedness under chapters 7,5 11,6 and 137 of the Code. Nothing explicit in
the Code prevents the debtor from choosing the chapter providing her
with the most personally benefic~al relief. Nothing in the Code prevents
this choice or warns of its potential consequences. Should the debtor
choose Chapter 13, however, she might find herself sucked through a
hole in the Code into a realm of uncertainty and unpredictability in

3. The analysis in this paper applies to every Chapter 13 case; it is not limited
to debtor professionals. The author, however, admits a particular interest in professionals
in bankruptcy, because the genesis of the present inquiry was the questions unanswered
in a previous article, Bradley M. Elbein, An Obscure Revolution: The Liabilities of
Professionals in Bankruptcy, 48 S.C.L. Rev. 743 (1997). Here, as in the previous article,
the term "professionals" refers to ''those who undertake any work calling for special
skill, [who] are required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do, but also
to possess a standard minimum of special knowledge and ability." W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 185 (5th ed. 1984)
(including attorneys, accountants, physicians, and corporate officers or directors).
4. 11 u.s.c. § 101-1330 (1994).
5. A discharge under Chapter 7 discharges "all debts," subject to exceptions
enumerated in § 727(a) (for a global denial of discharge to the debtor) and § 523 (for
denial of discharge of a particular claim). See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1994).
6. Under Chapter 11, the confirmation of a plan "discharges the debtor from any
debt," except those set out in § 523 and § 727(a). 11 U.S.C. § 114l(d)(l)(A) (1994).
7. Under Chapter 13, discharge of debts may be only partial. A debtor is required
to submit a plan for payments of her debts, and discharge under § 1328(a) generally
occurs only after the plan has been submitted. A complete discharge without satisfaction
of the p1an may occur when the debtor suffers under some "hardship" defined in
§ 1328(b). It should be noted that even under Chapter 13, however, some claims are
excepted from discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1994).
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which neither she nor her counsel can predict outcomes with any
confidence. 8
This article examines the chapter 13 discharge through its most
important element: good faith. Part I explores why Chapter 13 is such
an attractive option for debtors. Part II summarizes the eligibility
requirements of Chapter 13. Part ill examines the cases interpreting
good faith and determines that in most of them good faith is the crucial
hurdle to a successful Chapter 13.9 Part IV demonstrates that, for the
majority of courts, the "good faith" analysis transcends not only the
Code but the whole arena of law. Part V concludes that the courts'
interpretations of "good faith" have created a hole in the Code which
threatens a complete destruction of codified bankruptcy law.

8. It would be most fashionable to allude here to Alice in Wonderland as a
metaphor for the descent from the smooth pattern of legal logic into unpredictable
nonsense. In fact, a recent Westlaw search showed that more than 347 articles had
alluded to Lewis Carroll's famous works (actually entitled Alice's Adventures in
Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass). These articles were written about subjects
as diverse as human rights (Feisal Hussain Naqvi, People's Rights or Victim's Rights:
Reexamining the Conceptualization of Indigenous Rights in International Law, 71 IND.
L.J. 673 (1996)), corporate governance (Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and
Corporate Governance: You Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335
(1996)), and bankruptcy (Thomas J. Salemo, The Continuing Saga of the Statute of
Limitations Dilemma Under the Pre- and Post-1994 Amendments to Section 546, 15 AM.
BANKR. INS. J. 36 (1996)), to name only a few.
The allusion to Alice in Wonderland is inapposite despite the insistence of certain
critics of the legal profession that lay people are precisely like innocent children who
find themselves following a strangely muttering animal down a dark hole into an absurd
landscape. An allusion to Alice in Wonderland would miss key characteristics of a
debtor's experience in Chapter 13. Alice, for instance, acted intentionally in both
following the rabbit and in leaving her accustomed world behind. L. CARROLL, ALICE'S
ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND (1867). The closer metaphor is Dorothy in The Wizard
of Oz, who was sucked into Oz by a force she could not control and could not foresee.
Moreover, Dorothy's situation, not Alice's, is most similar to that of the debtor who
finds that she has fallen into the "good faith" vortex of chapter 13. "She was awakened
by a shock, so sudden and severe that if Dorothy had not been lying on the soft bed she
might have been hurt. As it was, the jar made her catch her breath and wonder what
had happened...." L. FRANK BAUM, THE WIZARD OF Oz 7 (1944).
9. An electronic data search created a corpus of 738 cases, from 1979 through
1996, interpreting "good faith" in Chapter 13. The author based the analysis in this
Article on a review of approximately 200 of these cases, selected by a refinement of the
search, as well as on the articles and authorities cited below.
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I.

A CHOICE, AN OPPORTUNITY AND A HOLE IN THE CODE

As a debtor and her counsel examine the Code, it becomes evident to
them that the differences in the discharge of debt offered in the three
chapters can be significant. There are sound reasons of strategy to
choose between the discharges available in chapters 7 and 13. 10 A
debtor who may file for protection under either chapter might choose,
for strategic reasons, to file first under chapter 7:
The filing of the chapter 7 case in the first instance may involve a question of
strategy as well as debtor motivation. The needs of the debtor and the debtor's
family may make such a course desirable. There may be doubt whether anyone
would file objections to discharge or complaints to determine dischargeability.
If no objections to discharge or no complaints to determine dischargeability are
filed, the debtor might secure adequate relief without filing a chapter 13 case.
The debtor may believe that the debtor can redeem the collateral and work out
an acceptable program of payments voluntarily with the secured creditors. If
this turns out successfully, the debtor could achieve the benefits of an
installment payment program with the. secured creditors, without payment to
unsecured creditors and without payment of the chapter 13 trustee's fees. If the
calculations of the debtor and counsel go awry, the chapter 7 case can always
be converted to chapter 13 case. The fall back position of chapter 13 is not lost
by the ori~nal filing of a chapter 7 case, especially since the right to convert
is absolute. 11

A debtor, alternatively, may wish to file initially under chapter 13, or to
convert from a chapter 7 to a chapter 13, for any of the following
reasons:
[T]he existence of one or more claims excepted from the operation of a chapter
7 discharge; the desire of the debtor to redeem collateral, and the inability to
do so in a lump sum payment; existence of nonexempt property which the
debtor desires to retain; the unavailability of a chapter 7 discharge; or the need
to protect a codebtor. In any of these or similar situations, a conversion motion
can be filed converting the [chapter 7] case to one under chapter 13. 12

These are all legitimate strategic reasons and none are considerations
prohibited by the explicit language of the Code.

10. This paper does not address the discharge available under Chapter 11. Of the
numerous debtors eligible under either Chapter 13 or Chapter 11, many choose Chapter
13 over Chapter 11 because of the cost and complexity of discharge under Chapter 11.
Moreover, Chapter 11 does not offer the breadth of discharge offered by Chapter 13.
For debtors concerned with a discharge, the choice must be between Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13.
11. 6 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE iflOl.08 at 101-27, 101-28
(Lawrence P. King, et al. eds., 15th· ed. 1996) [hereinafter COLLIER BANKRUPTCY
PRACTICE GUIDE].

12.
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The strategic choice between the two chapters may depend on one
issue: dischargeability. Some claims are dischargeable under some
chapters while non-dischargeable 13 under others. Chapter 7 contains a
large number of exceptions to discharge while Chapter 13 contains only
a few. Thus, claims arising from wilful misconduct, fraud or defalcation
(all nondischargeable under Chapter 7) may be discharged in Chapter 13.
For this reason, Chapter 13 provides a safe haven for debtors who would
otherwise be faced with liability that would survive the bankruptcy
discharge.
This haven, however, has a dark secret. To successfully obtain a
discharge of indebtedness through Chapter· 13, the debtor must meet
several statutory requirements. Among these statutory requirements is
"good faith." 14 Neither the Code nor the legislative history defines
good faith. Furthermore, the cases in which bankruptcy courts have
assessed good faith fail to fall into any pattern which would allow the
practitioner or her client to determine whether a debtor will survive the
good faith inquiry. "Good faith," in fact, takes the debtor from the safe
world of commercial and bankruptcy law, in which predictability is
valued above all things, 15 and expels her into an unpredictable void, in
which purity of heart, 16 not compliance with the Code, is what matters.

13. This article uses the technically incorrect terms "dischargeable" and
"nondischargeable" to refer to two types of claims under discussion throughout. On the
one hand, there are claims which are not exceptional, that is, which do not rise above
the undifferentiated mass of other debts from which the debtor seeks protection. These
claims are discharged along with other debt under the general rule that all unexceptional
liabilities are discharged. I call these claims "dischargeable," although technically it is
the corpus of claims which are dischargeable, not any one claim. On the other hand,
there are claims which are exceptional: they either rise above the mass of other claims
to receive an exception to discharge under § 523 or § 727(b), or form the basis for an
objection to discharge under § 727(c)(l). I refer to these exceptional claims as
"nondischargeable" or as "surviving bankruptcy." Faced with the choice of using the
technically correct terms "not excepted from discharge" and "subject to exception from
discharge" or "forming the basis for an objection to discharge" along with a series of
section numbers, or the less correct but more easily digested terms "dischargeable" and
"nondischargeable," I opted for readability.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1994).
15. See discussion infra Part IV.C., p. 485.
16. See discussion infra Part IV.A., p. 473.
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II.

CHAPTER

13 REQUIREMENTS

Chapter 13 offers real opportunity for relief through the expanded
discharge it makes available. In order to take advantage of this
opportunity, however, the debtor must first meet eligibility requirements.
In addition, after meeting the eligibility requirements, the debtor must
propose a plan which qualifies under the statute.
This article argues that the "good faith" requirement of Chapter 13 is
the pivotal issue. To provide the context for the analysis of the courts'
use of "good faith," it is helpful to sketch out the chapter's provisions.
Part II of this article examines the breadth of Chapter 13 discharge, the
requirements for a debtor to qualify under the chapter, and the statutory
requirements for a Chapter 13 plan.

A.

The Chapter 13 Super-Discharge

The Chapter 13 discharge is often referred to as a super-discharge
because it allows the discharge of liability for acts which are not
dischargeable under Chapter 7 .17 Under Chapter 7, claims for fraud or
defalcation18 are not dischargeable; nor are claims arising from willful
or malicious acts by the debtor. 19 Most claims for professional
malpractice fall into one or more of these categories; therefore, a debtor
professional cannot be certain of a discharge of malpractice liabilities
under Chapter 7.
Chapter 13 presents a marked contrast. Claiming Chapter 13
protection allows the debtor to discharge some claims which cannot be
discharged under Chapter 7. Although section 523 includes a long list
ofclaims excepted from discharge (particularly subsections 523(a)(4) and
523(a)(6)),20 which apply to discharges granted both under Chapter 721
and under the Chapter 13 hardship discharge,22 with only a few

17. See, e.g., In re Belt, 106 B.R. 553 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (1996).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1996).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (1994) excepts from discharge debts arising from "fraud
or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny," while 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1994) excepts debts "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor
to another entity or to the property of another entity."
21. 11 u.s.c. § 727 (1994).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (1994) provides a discharge without complete payment
under the confirmed plan, provided that the circumstances which prevent completion are
beyond the debtor's control. The subsection is fairly detailed and needs careful
examination by a debtor who wishes to invoke it Should a debtor seek a hardship
discharge, she will find that the liability that was nondischargeable in Chapter 7, but
dischargeable under§ 1325(a), becomes nondischargeable again through§ 1328(c)(2).
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exceptions, the claims nondischargeable under Chapter 7 are dischargeable under the main discharge provision of Chapter 13, § 1328(a).23
[This section] provides that as soon as practicable after the completion by the
debtor of all payments under the plan, the court shall grant the debtor a
discharge of all debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under section 502,
except the following: certain long-term debts described in section 1322(b)(5);
alimony and child support debts specified in section 523(a)(5); debts, as
specified in section 523(a)(8), for educational loans, benefit overpayments and
obligations to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship or
stipend; debts, as excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(9), arising from
any death or personal injury caused by a debtor's use of alcohol, drugs or other
substances while operating a motor vehicle; and debts for restitution or a
criminal fine included in a sentence on the debtor's conviction of a crime. 24

Thus, claims for subsection 523(a)(4) and 523(a)(6) liabilities, including
professional malpractice liabilities, may not be discharged under Chapter
7. These claims, however, may be dischargeable under Chapter 13
because they are not included in the list of claims excepted by the
exceptions to discharge. If the literal words of the statute are followed,
Chapter 13 allows the discharge of most of the liabilities which would
not be dischargeable under other chapters of the Code.

B.

Requirements for the Debtor

To earn the expansive discharge of Chapter 13, the debtor must
qualify under the statutory requirements of the chapter. The primary
limiting factor is the restrictive monetary limitation of section 109(e).25

23. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) provides that the court shall grant the debtor a discharge
of all debts except those provided for under §§ 1322(b)(5) (payments curing a default),
523(a)(5) (spousal and child support), 523(a)(8) (student loans), 523(a)(9) (death or
personal injury resulting from drunk driving), 523(a)(13) (restitution), or 523(a)(7) (a
criminal fine).
24. COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 11, ,r 101.04[2], at 10114, 101-15.
25. The debtor must owe, on the date of filing, less than $250,000 of noncontingent, liquidated and unsecured debt, and less than $750,000 of non-contingent,
liquidated and secured debt. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1994). This section should be
considered along with§ 502(c), which provides a mechanism for estimating contingent,
unliquidated claims. One way for a creditor to challenge a Chapter 13 claim is to
eschew the "good faith" attack considered in the text, and instead, show that the debtor's
debts exceed the debt ceiling. If successful, the creditor could force the debtor to
convert to a Chapter 7 or to file a Chapter 11, neither of which provide the broad
discharge which protect a debtor from ''nondischargeable" liability.
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Although recent amendments raised the ceiling amounts,26 these
monetary limitations may still prevent some debtors, particularly
professionals, from using this chapter. The debts which are included in
these limits are only noncontingent and liquidated.27 Cases debate at
great length the precise meaning of these terms. 28 If a debt is "liquidated,"29 it must be included in the calculation30 if it is also
noncontingent. If a debt is "noncontingent"31 it may be included if it
is also liquidated. Courts are unwilling to find a debt to be
noncontingent when the liability has not been determined prior to filing
for bankruptcy.32 Significantly for professionals seeking relief from
malpractice liability, one commentator has stated that a pending tort
claim is contingent and therefore does not count toward the debt that the
professional has to squeeze in under the statutory ceiling.33 Whether
the debtor disputes the claim, as is likely with professional malpractice
claims, is not relevant to the statutory ceiling calculation.34 There is
significance, however, if debtor admits readily ascertainable claims.35
There are other eligibility requirements, not as important for purposes
of this paper, including a limitation on prior bankruptcy filings, 36
citizenship37 and a regular income. 38 None of these requirements,

26. Pub. L. 103-394 § 108(a) raised the ceiling amounts from $100,000 and
$350,000 to $250,000 and $750,000 respectively. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1994).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1994).
28. See generally, COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 11, 1
101.03, at 101-8, 101-9.
29. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Wenberg (In re Wenberg), 94 B.R. 631 (9th Cir.
BAP 1988), ajf'd 902 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1988).
30. See In re McGovern, 122 B.R. 712 (Banlcr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
31. See generally COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 11, 1109.05.
32. See, e.g., In re Ramus, 37 B.R. 723 (Banlcr. N.D. Ga. 1984); In re Belt, 106
B.R. 553 (Banlcr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
33. COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 11, 1109.05.
34. See In re Jerome, 112 B.R. 563 (Banlcr. S.D. N.Y. 1990) (holding that, for the
purpose of determining Chapter 13 eligibility, a dispute regarding liability or amount of
a claim does not cause debt to be regarded as unliquidated).
35. See In re Ramus, 37 B.R. 723 (Banlcr. N.D. Ga. 1984) (holding the amount
was ascertainable when the debtor admitted the tort.)
36. See COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 11, 1101.03(a), at
101-9.
To deal with the problem of repetitive, abusive filings, the Code provides
that no individual may be a debtor under any chapter of the Banlcruptcy Code
who has been a debtor in a case pending under the Banlcruptcy Code at any
time within the preceding 180 days if: (1) the case was dismissed by the court
for failure of the debtor to bide by orders of the court, or to appear before the
court in proper prosecution of the case; or (2) the debtor requested and
obtained the voluntary dismissal of the case following the filing of a request
for relief from the automatic stay provided by section 362 of the Code.

Id.
37.
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however, are as significant and as likely to disqualify a debtor from
Chapter 13 relief as is the debt ceiling.

C.

Requirements for the Chapter 13 Plan

After meeting these eligibility requirements, the debtor must then
propose a plan which meets a different set of statutory requirements.
The requirements for the Chapter 13 plan are set out in the subsections
of § 1325(a). Five of these requirements are almost trivial; two are
administrative (that the debtor have paid any fees required to be paid,39
and that the plan comply with provisions of the statute4°); one is
common sense (that she be able to fulfill. her plan),41 one sets a
benchmark for payments to creditors,42 and one has to do with acceptance of the plan by creditors.43
The sixth subsection contains the key requirement of Chapter 13.
Section 1325(a)(3) provides that "the court shall confirm a plan if ...
the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means
forbidden by law.',44. This subsection contains three requirements for
the plan itself: that there first be a plan, that it be proposed in good

38. Id.
39. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(2) (1994).
40. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(l) (1994).
41. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (1994). My colleague Larry Teiger argues that the
question of plan "feasibility" embodied in this section is indeed far from trivial. He
suggests that the failure to meet the "feasibility" requirement stops a huge number of
plans.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1994).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (1994) (relating to treatment of secured claims). See
also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(l) (1994) (regarding objections relating to unsecured claims).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1994).
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faith,45 and that it not be proposed by any means forbidden by law.46
This subsection stakes out the real battleground for Chapter 13.
All of the requirements other than those of§ 1325(a)(3) are objectively ascertainable. Either a creditor objects to the plan or she does not;
either fees have been paid or they have not; either the debtor can comply
with the plan or she cannot. Good faith, however, is subjective:
subjective both in th~ sense that it inquires into the debtor's subjective
intention, and that it invites the judge to bring her own subjective
determination to bear. Herein lies the fundamental problem with
Chapter 13.

Ill.

Goon FAITH

Of the various statutory and judicial requirements for a Chapter 13
plan, the great weight of the determination rests on the question of
whether the plan was proposed in good faith as required by§ 1325(a)(3).
According to one writer, "[t]he controversy concerning the chapter 13
'good faith' test has resulted in more litigation than any other issue to
arise since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.',47 This section has
been interpreted as a policing mechanism to ensure that claims under
Chapter 13 serve to accomplish only the aims and objectives of
bankruptcy philosophy and not any other purpose.48 The majority of
courts aggressively use "good faith" to patrol the Code, but the results
of this policing are far from law or order.
In this section, I examine the corpus of cases interpreting the "good
faith" requirement. I begin by exploring the courts' duty to investigate

45. Only the plan, not the bankruptcy itself, must be filed in good faith. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(a)(3) (1994). See In re Siciliano, 167 B.R. 999 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994), In re
Flick, 14 B.R. 912 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981). However, many courts now import into
Chapter 13 a good faith filing requirement, which cannot be found in·the text. See In
re Love, 957 F.2d 1350 (7th Cir. 1992); In re Standfield, 152 B.R. 52 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1993); In re Ristic, 142 B.R. 856 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1992). Moreover, as noted in the
text below, the majority of cases interpreting good faith conduct an examination of the
way in which the debtor's debts arose, e.g., In re Smith, 848 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1988),
or of the totality of circumstances confronting the debtor, e.g., Metro Employees Credit
Union v. Okoreeh-Baah (In re Okoreeh-Baah), 836 F.2d 1030 (6th Cir. 1988)).
46. The meaning of the clause "not by any means forbidden" is not clear. A
diligent review of the relevant cases revealed no case interpreting this clause. As the
author has noted elsewhere, a vague or ill-defined term in the Code seems to invite
creative development of the law. See Elbein, supra note 3. This phrase would, therefore,
seem to be fertile ground for judicial improvisation.
. 47. Conrad K. Cyr, The Chapter 13 "Good Faith" Tempest: An Analysis And
Proposal For Change, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 271, 273 (1981) (citing 53 cases through
1981 ). An additional approximately 700 "good faith" cases followed during the next 15
years from 1981 until 1996. See supra note 9.
48. In re Chase, 43 B.R. 739 (D. Md. 1984).
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good faith and the debtor's duty to carry her burden of proof on the
issue. I then attempt to define the phrase, "good faith." The section
concludes with an analysis of the factors used by courts to determine
whether the "good faith" requirement has been satisfied.

A.

The Court:S- Duty

The bankruptcy court must exercise an independent duty to determine
whether the plan is confirmable, and whether or not a creditor objects to
the plan.49 The court's duty is "independent" of action by any other
party. 50 This judicial determination considers not only whether the
statutory requirements have been fulfilled, but also whether the plan is
proposed in good faith. 51 The good faith finding must be a separate
and specific finding. 52 A specific finding by the court is required
irrespective of whether an objection to the plan is lodged.53

B.

The Burden of Proof

The court may have an independent duty to review the plan, but the
burden of proof falls on the debtor who proposes it.54 This can be a
heavy burden,55 its weight perhaps depending on the extent of the
creditor's claims. 56 For some courts, the debtor has no burden beyond
showing that the plan was proposed in good faith. 57 Even if a party in
49. In re Gurst, 76 B.R. 985 (Banlcr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
50. In re Harris, 62 B.R. 391 (Banlcr. E.D. Mich. 1986); In re Bowles, 48 B.R. 502
(Banlcr. E.D. Va. 1985).
51. In re Belt, 106 B.R. 553 (Banlcr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (emphasizing that the court's
inquiry should focus on whether the plan abuses Chapter 13's provisions, purpose or
spirit).
52. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Warren (In re Warren), 89 B.R. 87 (9th Cir.
BAP 1988); Johnson v. Vanguard Holding Corp. (In re Johnson), 708 F.2d 865 (2nd Cir.
1983).
53. In re Hartdegen, 67 B.R. 230 (Banlcr. N.D. Ala. 1986).
54. Hardin v. Caldwell (In re Caldwell), 895 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1990); In re
Elisade, 172 B.R. 996 (Banlcr. M.D. Fla. 1994); In re Standfield, 152 B.R. 528 (Banlcr.
N.D. Ill. 1993); In re Lewis, 170 B.R. 861 (Banlcr. D. Md. 1994); In re Humphrey, 165
B.R. 508 (Banlcr. M.D. Fla. 1994); In re Lessman, 159 B.R. 135 (Banlcr. S.D.N.Y.
1993); In re Sullivan, 40 B.R. 914 (Banlcr. E.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Smith, 39 B.R. 57
(Banlcr. S.D. Fla. 1984).
55. In re Farmer, 186 B.R. 781 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1995).
56. In re Warren, 89 B.R. 87 (9th Cir. BAP 1988); In re Noonan, 162 B.R. 581
(Banlcr. M.D. Fla. 1993). See also In re Farmer, 186 B.R. 781 (Banlcr. D.R.I. 1995).
57. In re Hines, 723 F.2d 333 (3rd Cir. 1983).
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interest files an objection, the debtor still has to prove her eligibility for
Chapter 13 relief, 58 although the objector must carry his own burden of
proof on the objection. 59
The debtor walks a narrow path. If the plan is confirmable, confirmation is mandatory60 even if there are objections· (as long as objections
are overcome).61 Yet, even if the debtor complies with the express
provisions of the law, she may be denied confirmation of a plan if the
spirit of the law has been violated. Thus, even if all tests for approval
of a Chapter 13 plan are met, a plan confirmation may be denied ifthere
is a perceived abuse of the provisions, purpose or spirit of Chapter
13,62 or if the bankruptcy petition is filed in order to perpetrate a
fraud. 63 The license for this elevation of spirit over statute rests on two
words: "good faith."
·
·

' C.

Good Faith

What is "good faith?" The Code· does not· define it.64 . Courts
acknowledge that the concept is amorphous. 65 Most courts reach the
conclusion that a debtor's good faith is to be judged by the totality of
the circumstances,66 even-though this standard leaves "good faith" with

58. Tillman v. Lombard, 156 B.R. 156 (E.D. Va. 1993).
59. In re Sitarz, 150 B.R. 710 (Banlcr. D. Minn. 1993); In re Cruz, 75 B.R. 56 (D.
P.R. 1987).
60. Benevides v. Alexander (In re Alexander), 670 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1982).
61. In re Fizer, 1 B.R. 400 (Banlcr. S.D. Ohio 1979).
62. In re Belt, 106 B.R. 553 (Banlcr. N.D. Ind. 1989); In re Kem, 40 B.R. -26
(Banlcr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
63. In re Norman, 162 B.R. 581 (Banlcr. M.D. Fla. ·1993) (determining that debtor
coordinated his late filings of federal tax returns and Chapter 13 petition in order to
perpetrate a fraud on the U.S. Government).
64. It would be unfair to allege that the Code defines nothing useful. Section 101
is replete with useful definitions, such as "accountant," "attorney," and "United States."
Because "good faith" is so critical to the success of a Chapter 13 plan, however, the
drafters might have provided some guidance on this phrase. Any guidance, no matter
how ineffectual, might have assisted the courts in interpreting.this section, and prevented
the chaos that Part V discusses.
·
65. See, e.g., St. Luke Parish Fed. Credit Union v. Wourms, 14 B.R.· 169 (Banlcr.
S.D. Ohio 1981).
.
.
·
66. See, e.g., State of Ohio, Student Loan Comm'n v. Doersam (In re Doersam),
849 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1988); Spokane Ry. Credit Union v. Gonzales (In re Gonzales),
172 B.R. 320 (E.D. Wash. 1994); In re Solomon, 166 B.R. 832 (Banlcr. Md. 1994), aff'd
173 B.R. 325 (D.Md. 1994), rev'd 67 F.3d 1128 (4th Cir. 1995); In re Oglesby, 158
B.R. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1993), on remand 161 B.R. 917 (Banlcr. E.D. Pa. 1993); In re
Huerta, 137 B.R. 356 (Banlcr. C.D. Cal. 1992); In re Reyes, 106 B.R. 155 (Banlcr. N.D.
Ill. 1989); Fidelity & Cas. Co. ofN.Y. v. Warren (In re Warren), 89 B.R. 87 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 1988); Downey Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Metz (In re Metz), 67 B.R. 462 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 1986), aff'd 820 F.2d 1495 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Sellers, 33 B.R. 854 (Banlcr. D.
Colo. 1983); In re Wilheim, 29 B.R. 912 (Banlcr. D.N.J. 1983); In re Tauscher, 26 B.R.
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no semantic content at all. 67 By not having a precise definition, the
practitioner and the courts must search for guidance as to how to satisfy
the requirement.
The phrase "good faith" is not uncommon in other areas of commercial law. A practitioner might reasonably expect some elucidation in
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, or in the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC). Some courts · helpfully suggest that the good faith
referenced in Chapter 13 must be identical to the good faith required in
Chapter 11 reorganizations. 68 Ultimately, however, the good faith
requirement in Chapter 11 functions merely as a shorthand authorization
for the bankruptcy courts to police their own jurisdiction.69 In the
words of one court, "[g]ood faith ... is merged into the power of the
court to protect its jurisdictional integrity from schemes of improper
petitioners seeking to circumvent jurisdictional restrictions and from
petitioners with demonstrable frivolous purposes absent any economic
reality. " 70 That the term should resist elucidation throughout the Code
is not surprising because the same corpus of judges interpret Chapter 11
and Chapter 13.71

99 (Banlcr. E.D. Wis. 1982). See also cases cited infra note 79.
67. To put this in plain language without lapsing into semiotics: the "totality of the
circumstances" is a completely unbounded set of factors, in essence an infinite set. By
saying that "good faith" signifies the examination of the totality of the circumstances,
we say that good faith refers to that infinite set. If the "meaning'' of a concept is an
infinite set of possibilities, then the concept has no exclusive meaning. Yet a "meaning"
by definition must be more or less exclusive (at least, exclusive enough to define what
a "meaning" does not mean). When the signifier signifies a non-exclusive set of
signifieds, then the larger the set of possible signifieds, the more "vague" the signifier
is. When the set of signifieds is infinitely large (e.g., when "good faith" means the
"totality of the circumstances"), the signifier (good faith), refers to everything and
therefore means nothing. To a semiotician, it would be clear that this is the reason that
courts can fill the empty concept of "good faith" with any content they desire; to a
lawyer, this does not assist in determining how to satisfy the good faith requirement.
68. In re Schaitz, 913 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Wiggles, 7 B.R. 373 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1980).
69. See Brian S. Katz, Single-Asset Real Estate Cases and the Good Faith
Requirement: Why Reluctance to Ask Whether a Case Belongs in Bankruptcy May Lead
to the Incorrect Result, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 77 (1992); see also Note, Good Faith and
Chapter 13 Discharge: How Much Discretion is Too Much?, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 657
(1989).
70. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 Bankr. 727, 737 (Bankr. S.D,N.Y. 1984)
(quoting In re N.W. Recreational Activities, Inc., 4 B.R. 36, 39 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980)).
71. This is not surprising in human terms: judges are as bedeviled by apparent
inconsistency as are the rest of us. But is this not a foolish consistency given the
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The UCC promises to be more helpful. The commercial code defines
good faith twice: once in its definitions section72 and once in the Sales
article. 73 The term appears in more than fifty other sections of the
Commercial Code. Some commentators have managed to glean general
rules about its meaning:
The Code employs two standards of good faith. Section 1-201(19) states the
generally applicable "subjective" ("white heart and empty head") standard
which concentrates on the actual state of mind of the party rather than on the
state of mind a reasonable man would have had under the same circumstances.
Thus, the section defines good faith as "honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned." In the case of merchants, however, or at least those
merchants governed by Article 2 on Sales, an objective element is added to
their good faith duties. Section 2-103(l}{b) provides that "[g]ood faith' in the
case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." This definition imposes a
duty on merchants to meet rood faith requirements that are measured both
subjectively and objectively.7

If the reader does not see how these abstract definitions apply to our
Chapter 13 problem, she is not alone. One bankruptcy scholar, having
reviewed tlie UCC in the forlorn hope of finding assistance, laments that
"[g]ood faith is one of the least specific standards in the law today.
Even outside of bankruptcy, contracts scholars have long debated what
good faith means."75 Her summary of the debate proves that years of

different contexts of the two chapters? In Chapter 11, if the reorganization is to succeed,
the debtor and creditor must continue to have a commercial relationship. Such a
relationship might be said to require honesty of intention in the future, of the kind
required between the parties in a commercial contract. For this reason, a kind of
transactional good faith is required in Chapter 11. But in a Chapter 13 action, once the
plan is approved the transaction is over. The debtor and creditor need have no future
relationship. Instead, the creditor, if he is to have any continuing relationship, has one
with the court. The only point at which the debtor's good faith intentions for the future
are relevant to the creditor is during the proposal of the plan. For that reason, one
would think that in Chapter 13 the courts would focus on what might be called
propositional good faith: i.e., the question of whether the plan has been proposed with
the honest intent to execute it. As noted below, however, the majority of courts neither
recognize a difference in contexts nor limit themselves to propositional (or ''plan") good
faith.
72. U.C.C. § l-201(19) (1995) (stating that "'[g]ood faith' means honesty in fact
in the conduct or transaction concerned.").
73. U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b) (1995) (providing that "'[g]ood faith' in the case of a
merchant means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing in the trade.").
74. WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES, § 1-203:01
(1995).
.
75. Janet A. Flaccus, Have Eight Circuits Shorted? Good Faith and Chapter 11
Bankruptcy Petitions, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 401, 436 (1993).

452

[VOL. 34: 439, 1997]

Chapter 13
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

dispute have produced much paper and no resolution. 76 Ultimately,
there is little help to be found in the Commercial Code.

D.

Factors in Evaluating the Debtor's Good Faith

Because the Bankruptcy Code does not provide a definition of good
faith, the practitioner and the courts have had to attempt to discern a
pattern among the cases interpreting the phrase. Courts have been
generous in setting out the factors which they use to measure the
debtor's conduct against the good faith standard. Sometimes courts
simplify the factors into one loose principle: the debtor need not satisfy
all of the factors set out in the various opinions as long as the plan is
proposed with a legitimate purpose by debtors who have a reasonable
hope of reorganizing. 77 More commonly, however, the cases set out a

76. Professor Flaccus, tracing the outlines of the debate in footnote 264 of her
excellent article, refers to:
Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" In General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968)
(arguing that the only way to define good faith is to see what conduct it
excludes, i.e. "Bad faith," Id. at 199-207, and even "bad faith" is difficult to
pin down. Id.). Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law
Duty to Peiform In Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980) (argues that
good faith can be defined by using certain economic principles; the party
exercising discretion performs in good faith when it exercises discretion for
any purpose within the contemplation of the parties), Robert S. Summers, The
General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982) (disagrees with Professor Burton); Steven J.
Burton, More on Good Faith Peiformance ofa Contract: A Reply to Professor
Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1984) (argues that Summers has not
convincingly criticized Burton's contribution); Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic
Behavior and the Law ofContracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1981) (argues that
good faith is a doctrine that deters opportunism and this helps to give it
definition).
Id. at 436, n.264. See also E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Peiformance and
Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code,30 U. Cm. L. REV.
666 (1963); accord Mark Snyderman, Comment, What's So Good About Good Faith?
The Good Faith Peiformance Obligation in Commercial Lending, 55 U. Cm. L. REV.
1335 (1988).
77. In re Hope, 184 B.R. 590 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995).
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laundry list of factors. 78 The majority of courts agree on the following
factors:
1. amount of proposed plan;
2. amount of debtor's surplus;
3. debtor's ability to earn;
4. probable duration of plan;
5. accuracy of plan's statements;
6. extent of preferential treatment between classes of creditors;
7. extent to which secured claims are modified;
8. . type of debt to be discharged;
9. whether any discharged debt is nondischargeable in Chapter 7;
10. existence of special circumstances such as inordinate medical
expenses;
11. frequency with which debtor has sought bankruptcy relief;
12. motivation and sincerity of debtor;
13. burden which plan's administration would place upon trustee.19
.
Other courts vary the list slightly, adding or substituting factors·such as:
14. debtor's honesty in representing facts; 80
15. amount of attorneys fees; 81
16. living expenses of debtor and dependents;82
17. legal and equitable effect of proposed plan.83
Neither list is prescriptive: a debtor may find a court uninterested in
· many of these factors. · Yet neither list is exclusive either, because there
may be other dispositive factors. 84 The reality is that the courts will
announce the factors they intend to consider and then make conclusory
determinations whether or not a plan has been proposed in good faith
without explicitly weighing the results of their inquiries.
·

78. Robinson v. Tenantry (In re Robinson), 987 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1993); Soc'y
Nat'l Bank v. Barrett (In re Barrett), 964 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1992) (listing also the
factors of amount ofattomey's fees and debtor's living expenses); State of Ohio, Student
Loan Comm'n v. Doersam (In re Doersam), 849 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1988) (adding
debtor's sincerity, motivations, degree of effort and ability to earn).
79. In re Doersam, 849 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1988); Flygare v. Boulden, 709 F.2d
1344 (10th Cir. 1983); Kitchens v. Georgia Ry. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Kitchens), 702
F.2d 885 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311 (8th Cir.
1982); Fidelity & Cas. Co. ofN.Y. v. Warren (In re Warren), 89 B.R. 87 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 1988). See also In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. 256 (Bankr. C. D. Utah 1980).
SO. In re Oliver, 186 B.R. 403 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995).
81. In re Wilson, 168 B.R. 260, 262 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1994).
82. Id.
83. In re Whipple, 138 B.R. 137 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1991).
84. In re Tobiason, 185 B.R. 59 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995); In re Kitchens, 702 F.2d
885 (11th Cir. 1983).
·
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Some courts focus their "good faith" analysis ori other issues. The
court mi~ht rely on the length or duration of a Chapter 13 plan in its
decision. 5 Another court might l~ok at whether the debtor has
allocated a "sufficient" portion of her income to payments under a
plan. 86 In determining allocation, however, the court may only
consider allocation urider limited circumstances.87 A court might focus
only on the sufficiency of payments to unsecured creditors. Some courts
require some payment to unsecured creditors to satisfy the "good faith"
requirement. 8 Other courts require no such payment,89 or focus on
the percentage of payment as the dispositive factor. 90
At first glance these opinions seem to be scattered randomly about the
landscape. But they are not a~ disparate as they appear. They naturally
cluster into two distinct approaches to the good faith requirement. The
cases utilizing one approach ponduct the good faith inquiry as an
investigation strictly into the debtor's conduct in _proposing a plan. I

85. Hardin v. Caldwell (In re Caldwell), 895 F.2d '1123, 1127 (6th Cir. 1990); In
re Smith, 130 B.R. 102, 105 (Bankr. D. Utah 1991). See also In re Tobiason, 185 B.R.
59, 63, 64 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995); In re Green, 169 B.R. 480, 483 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
1994); In re Balcer, 129 B.R. 127 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991); In re Carpico, 117 B.R. 335,
336, 337 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); In re Jackson, 91 B.R. 473 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988);
In re Rogers, 65 B.R. 1018 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) (illustrating that a court took
offense to a debtor's extension of his plan long enough to pay·offhis sports car, but not
long enough to pay off unsecured creditors).
·
86. In re Adamu, 82 B.R. 128 (Bankr. D. Or. 1988) (holding that allocation of
income to plan was sufficient where all of disposable income went to payments of
creditors); In re Curry, 77 B.R. 969 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987) (determining that allocation
of income was not sufficient where debtor, a minister, made charitable contributions to
church of 50% of his income); In re Hale, 65 B.R. 893 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1986) (finding
that allocation wasn't sufficient because debtors did not malce any effort to reduce their
standard ofliving in order to maximize the plan distributions). See also infra note 147.
87. In re Stein, 91 B.R. 796, 802, 803 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988).
88. Tenny v. Terry (In re Terry), 630 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1980); In re Saglio, 153
B.R. 4 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1993); In re ~indsey, 122 B.R. 157 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); In
re Lattimore, 69 B.R. 622 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987); bi re Smith, 39 B.R. 57 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1984); In re Wojick, 10 B.R. 328 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); In re Iacovoni, 2
B.R. 256 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980); In re Hobday,.4 B.R. 417 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980).
89. Downey Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Metz (In re Metz), 820 F.2d 1495 (9th Cir.
1987); In re Weiss, 34 B.R. 346 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (noting that the fact that
nominal payments are to be made to unsecured creditors is not a per se violation of good
faith requirement); U.S. Life Credit v. Carter (In re Carter), 9 B.R. 140 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1981); Fidelity Nat'l Bank v. Walsey (In re Walsey), 7 B.R. 779 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1980); In re Cloutier, 3 B.R. 584 (Bankr. D.Colo. 1980).
90. In re Anderson, 3 B.R. 160 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980); Cleveland Trust Co. v.
Keckler (In re Keckler), 3 B.R. 155 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980). .
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shall refer to these cases as the plan good faith cases. The courts in the
cases illustrating the other approach base their determination of good
faith on the debtor's pre-plan and even pre-petition conduct. These
courts concentrate on what might be referred to as broad good faith. I
shall examine these distinct approaches in detail below and derive an
organizing principle which is driven by the difference in philosophy
between the two approaches.

1.

Plan Good Faith

The explicit terms of§ 1325(a)(3) require only an evaluation of good
faith in the proposal of the plan. We may not have a clear definition of
what constitutes "good faith," but the statute plainly dictates that good
faith be considered with respect to proposal of the plan. Despite the
plain meaning of the statute, only a minority of courts apply
§ 1325(a)(3) as written. 91 To this minority, it is clear that the good
faith requirement relates only to the proposing of the plan, and therefore,
these courts may most succinctly be referred to as the plan good faith
courts.
This reliance on the statute itself has an interesting result. The plan
good faith courts seldom rely on the legislative history of the statute. A
few of them buttress their interpretations of the statute with arguments
from the legislative history, but more commonly there is a decided lack
of interest in that rather obscure and ambiguous source. This lack of
interest is the direct result of relying on the unambiguous words of the
statute, and it stands in startling contrast to the. attention paid to the
legislative history by the broad good faith courts.
A few early cases relied on their own close reading of the statute to
determine that "good faith" was to be judged strictly in relation to
proposing the plan, and not in relation to any broader factors (such as
pre-petition conduct).92 That is to say, "[s]ection 1325(a)(3) provides
that the debtor's plan must be proposed in good faith, not that the debt
was incurred in good faith." 93 Later cases reached the same conclusion,

91. For the basis of this conclusion, see supra note 9, and.infra note 173.
92. See, e.g., In re Carter, 9 B.R. 140 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981), G.F.C. Consumer
Discount Co. v. Scott (In re Scott), 7 B.R. 692 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980) (determining,
after a close reading of§ 1325, that everything not excepted is discharged); Overland
Park Dodge, Inc. v. Graff(In re Graft), 7 B.R. 426 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980) (determining,
after a review of statutory provisions and amendments, that Congress' clear intent was
to allow the discharge of otherwise nondischargeable liability). See also Ravenot v.
Rimgale (In re Rimgale), 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1982) (providing a list of factors to
guide the good faith analysis-all involving the debtor's conduct in proposing the plan).
93. In re Belt, 106 B.R. 553, 564 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (quoting In re Smith,
848 F.2d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 1988).
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but did so explicitly in revolt against a tide of judicial activism that
interpreted "good faith" as "a license to read into the statute requirements Congress did not enact."94 While there is some evidence that the
Supreme Court might adopt this strict interpretation of the statute, the
Court has not directly addressed the issue.95 Today, few cases and few
scholars pitch their tents in the plan good faith camp.96

94. In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426,431 (7th Cir. 1982). See also In re Schaitz, 913
F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Farley, 114 B.R. 711 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990).
95. In three relatively recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has held
strictly to the terms of the Bankruptcy Code, although none of these cases directly
addresses "good faith." Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991) was a chapter
13 case dealing with serial filing. Refusing to infer a limitation on serial filing from the
silence of the Code, the Supreme Court held that "expressly enumerated exceptions [are]
presumed to be exclusive." Id. at 87 (following the holding.of United States v. Smith,
499 U.S. 160, 167 (1991)). -In Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991) and Taylor v.
Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992), the Court held that the courts have no authority
to place limitations on various sections of the Code (11 U.S.C. § 109 (1994) and 11
U.S.C. § 522(1) (1994) respectively) where Congress did not do so. Applied to the
"good faith" context in Chapter 13, these opinions suggest that the Supreme Court would
look to the plain meaning of the statute and refuse to read into the Code requirements
that Congress did not see fit to write in.
96. Of the few articles on "good faith," two are noteworthy, and both address
Chapter 11 's "good faith" requirement. Prof. Janet A. Flaccus, in Have Eight Circuits
Shorted? Good Faith and Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petitions, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 401
(1993), argues energetically that the history of bankruptcy and the legislative history of
the Code belie the broader readings of good faith in Chapter 11. Eugene J. DiDonato,
in Good Faith Reorganization Petitions: The Back Door Lets the Stranger In, 16 CONN.
L. REV. 1 (1983), reaches an opposite conclusion, though much of his article supports
the strict interpretation of the statute. DiDonato notes, for example, that upon a close
reading of Chapter 11, the statute does not require a petition to be filed in good faith but
instead requires that only the plan be filed in good faith. Id. Thus, DiDonato illustrates
(without commenting on it) the strict parallelism in the Code: in both chapters allowing
a plan of reorganization, the statute requires only propositional good faith. Id.
DiDonato' s article is also interesting in its musings on alternate grounds for deriving
a good faith filing requirement. He notes the following possible statutory bases: 11
U.S.C. § 30S(a)(l) (1994) allows the court after notice and hearing, to dismiss a case "if
the interests of the debtor and creditor would be better served," id. at 5, 6; 11 U.S.C.
§ 105 (1994): "A bankruptcy court has the powers of a court of equity and under section
1OS may issue any order, process or judgment necessary to carry out the provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code. Because a bad faith petition constitutes an imposition on the
court's jurisdiction, it is subject to dismissal based on equitable principles such as lex
nemini operatur iniquum, neminifacit injuriam (the law never works an injury, nor does
a wrong) or equitable doctrines such as the doctrine of clean hands," id. at 6, and 11
U.S.C. § 362(d) (1994), permitting relief from stay for cause upon application ofa party
in interest: "[A]lthough section 362(d) does not sanction dismissal of an entire case, by
providing for the elimination of the stay if a petition is filed in bad faith, it has the effect
of enforcing a good faith requirement." Id. at 7. These alternate grounds are critical for
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The plan good faith cases further cluster into subgroups. Courts
reading the statute restrictively tend to concern themselves with five
issues: whether the plan is non-discriminatory; whether the plan
encompasses the debtor's best efforts; whether the percentage of
repayment is sufficient; whether the debtor has complied with the Code's
procedural 'provisions; and whether the debtor's intentions in proposing
the plan are honest.
·
A plan which unfairly discriminates between creditors is said to violate
the good faith requirement. 97 Few of the cases explain where an antidiscrimination provision resides in·§ 1325(a) and this provision is not
explicit in the Code. Courts have apparently imported the§ 1325(a)(3)
non-discrimination requirement from§ 1322(b)(l).98 More commonly,
cases hold that <liscnminatory treatment may merely bear on the good
faith determination.99 According to some courts, discriminatory plans
cannot be confirmed; 100 other courts approve plans which are discriminatory, as long as there is a reasoned discrimination. 101 For some
courts, discrimination becomes significant only where a Chapter 7
bankruptcy is converted to a Chapter 13 .102 In these cases, there is no
particular pattern, except that th~se courts confine their inquiry to the
terms of the proposed plan. · ·
·
·
A second factor· examined by plan good faith courts is whether the
debtor has drafted a plan which encompasses her best efforts. 103 It is
not clear in which direction the debtor's best efforts must lie.· On the
one hand, the best effort toward complying with statutory requirements
does not suffice for "good faith" to be met. 104 The most reasonable
conclusion is that the debtor is required to make her best efforts toward

DiDonato, because he is apparently determined to assert a good faith filing requirement.
These alternatives are also interesting for our purposes, because a good faith filing
requirement in Chapter 13, based on one or more of the sections cited above, might be
a great deal more attractive than the arguments used by the courts. In addition, relying
on these alternate grounds might avoid the judicial flights of fancy set out and analyzed
in the text below. ·
97. In re Whittaker, 113 B.R. 531 (Banlcr. D. Minn. 1990).
98. Section 1322, "Contents of plan," provides in subsection (b)(l) that the plan
may designate a class or classes of unsecured claims, but ''may not discriminate unfairly
against any class so designated." 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (1994).
99. In re Sellers, 33 B.R. 854 (Banlcr. D. Colo. 1983).
100. In re Mielke 39 B.R. 556 (Banlcr. D. N.D. 1984); In re Moore, 24 B.R. 857
(Banlcr. N.D. Ill. 1982); In re Walker, 20 B.R. 372 (Banlcr. E.D. Va. 1982); In re
Cooper, 3 B.R. 246 (Banlcr. S.D. Cal. 1980).
101. In re Whittaker, 113 B.R. 531 (Banlcr. D. Minn. 1990).
102. In re Warner, 115 B.R. 233 (Banlcr. C.D. Cal. 1989).
103. In re Heard, 6 B.R. 876 (Banlcr. W.D. Ky. 1980).
104. Hardin v. Caldwell (In re Caldwell), 895 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1990).
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funding the plan. 105 Courts occasionally provide a laundry list of
factors when they make this "best efforts" inquiry. 106 On other hand,
best efforts, even admitted as such, may be insufficient for a plan to be
considered filed in good faith. 107 In fact, the debtor may not even be
required 108 to use her best efforts. As with the non-discrimination
requirement, the origin of the "best efforts" requirement is unclear. This
requirement certainly is not expressed in the statute and may be a legacy
from pre-Code practice.
A third inquiry in plan good faith considerations is whether a plan
serves the best interests of the creditors. Some courts claim that the
"'best interest of creditors test' [is] embodied in Section 1325(a)(4)."109
This section, however, certainly does not explicitly contain this test. 110
This consideration may also remain from previous practice. The "best
interests of the creditors" test was an old test, supplanted by new judicial
guidelines for good faith objections. 111 Nevertheless, there are numerous references in Chapter 13 plan confirmation cases to a. "best interests
of creditors" test. 112 As might be expected, a plan's adequacy to meet
the "best interests of the creditors" does ·not guarantee con:firmation. 113
A fourth inquiry provides the clearest and broadest distinction between
the plan good faith and the broad good faith approaches. This
investigation inquires into the debtor's equitable conduct within the Code
and its procedural provisions, including its provisions for disclosure to

105. Fidelity & Cas. Co. ofN.Y. v. Warren (In re Warren), 89 B.R. 87 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 1988); In re Myers, 52 B.R. 248 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985); In re Weyand, 33 B.R.
553 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); In re Ware, 9 B.R. 24 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981).
106. In re Hildremyr, 8 B.R. 676 (Bankr. S.D. 1981).
107. In re Kuriakuz, 155 B.R. 454 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993).
108. In re Roy, 5 B.R. 611 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1980).
109. In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. 256, 262 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
110. Section 1325(a)(4) provides that "the court shall confirm a plan if ... the
value ... of property to be distributed under the plan on account of each allowed
unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would be paid ... under chapter 7 .
. . ." 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1994). It might be argued that the best interest of the
creditors (even in a Chapter 13 which would have been a no-asset Chapter 7 liquidation)
would always be to have a judgment rather than a zero or minimal payment and a
discharge. Nevertheless, this section is generally referred to as the "best interests of the
creditors" test.
111. In re Ramus, 37 B.R. 723 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984).
112. In re Turner, 168 B.R. 882 (Bankr. W.D. Texas 1994); In re Doddy, 164 B.R.
276 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994).
113. Cherry Creek Homeowners Ass'n v. Lincoln (In re Lincoln), 30 B.R. 905
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1983).
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creditors and the court and the Code's payment provisions. Where the
misconduct is intentional, the court's decision is easy. Good faith cannot
be found where the debtor abuses the bankruptcy process by using the
Code for unfair advantage in business, 114 nor where the debtor acts to
prevent orderly and fair adjustment of credit relationships. 115 Misrepresentations in the plan or the bankruptcy schedules will usually lead to
a "bad faith finding." 116 Here, of course, courts are on firm ground
because these kinds of abuses are prohibited in Chapter 13 through the
application of§ 105(a) 117 and § 1307.118
The plan good faith courts, however, do not limit their investigation
of the equitable conduct of the debtor in bankruptcy to willful misconduct. They also examine conduct that does not rise to the level of
intentional misconduct, or at least cannot be proven to be such. Factors
in determining whether a debtor has acted equitably within the bankruptcy process include a failure to list creditors, 119 high expenses, 120 and
a failure or refusal to produce records requested by creditors. 121 One
point must be clear, because it looms large in the later analysis: in each
of these analyses, even in an examination of equitable conduct, the plan
good fait~ courts restrict their inquiry to conduct related to the plan
itself.
Some of the plan good faith courts conduct a still more searching
examination, even broader than the "equitable conduct" analysis. These
courts examine the honesty of the debtor's intention in filing her plan.
114. Shell Oil Co. v. Waldron (In re Waldron), 785 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1986), cert.
dismissed, 478 U.S. 1028 (1986).
115. In re Elisade, 172 B.R. 996 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994).
116. Heid v. Goeb (In re Goeb), 675 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Jacobs, 43
B.R. 971 (Bankr. N.Y. 1984) (illustrating that when court learns of material misrepresentations, it has duty to conduct a good faith hearing to safeguard the integrity of the
bankruptcy process).
117. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994) grants the court broad power to "issue any order,
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this
title," as well as "sua sponte, [take] any action or [make] any determination necessary
or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of
process."
118. 11 U.S.C. § 1307 (1994) sets out the conditions upon which a Chapter 13
filing can be voluntarily or involuntarily converted to a Chapter 7 or dismissed. Among
the grounds listed are unreasonable delay, nonpayment of fees, failure to file a plan or
make payments, and so forth.
119. In re Tipton, 118 B.R. 12 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990); In re Hartdegen, 67 B.R.
230 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1986).
120. In re Strong, 26 B.R. 814 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983) (determining that high
· monthly expenses were too far outside the spirit and purpose of the Code to be in good
faith).
121. In re Sullivan, 40 B.R. 914 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1984) (holding that the plan was
not proposed in good faith when the debtor failed to cooperate with creditors who were
investigating his financial conditions).
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Honesty in this context pears to means full and complete disclosure,
and honesty of purpose.' This inquiry is the most radical of the plan
good faith examinations, because it is not objectively discoverable and
involves an element not stated in the statute and not.
Both of the last two inquiries push the boundaries of what we have
called plan good faith. Both inquiries look beyond the Chapter 13 plan
to a consideration of the conduct during the pendency of the bankruptcy
itself. What is most interesting about these inquiries is what they fail to
determine. None of the plan good faith cases inquire into the debtor's
conduct prior to the bankruptcy filing. That inquiry would seem to be
far beyond the Bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. The plan good faith
cases, even at their most expansive "equitable conduct" and "honesty of
intention" analyses, stop short of making this inquiry. For this reason,
although the "equitable conduct" and "honesty of intention" cases
undertake the broadest of the plan good faith analyses, these cases
generally do not find a lack of good faith. Thus, even with this broader
approach, a ·court which undertakes a plan good faith inquiry most likely
will find that a plan has been filed in good faith. 123

2.

Broad Good Faith

Other courts are not so restrained. The courts which undertake the
broad good faith inquiry-representing the vast majority of good faith
cases-examine debtor's pre-plan and even pre-petition conduct. The
broad good faith inquiry begins where the plan good faith inquiry ends.
The plan good faith courts might look beyond the plan, but even the
most zealous confine themselves to an examination of the debtor's
conduct within the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. The broad good faith
courts begin their inquiry by focussing on the debtor's conduct before

122. In re Tobiason, 185 B.R. 59 (Banlcr. D. Neb. 1995); In re Graves, 19 B.R. 402
(Banlcr. W.D. La. 1982); In re Wiggles, 7 B.R. 373 (Banlcr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
123. See statistics discussed infra note 173. There should be no mystery as to why
this is so. The narrower the inquiry, the fewer factors the judge will consider. The
fewer factors considered, the less chance that the court will find facts that might be
considered "bad faith." The broader the inquiry, the greater chance that the creditor will
present evidence or the court will discover facts that alleged bad faith. As banlcruptcy
judge William Greendyke noted, "every debtor 'is a bad guy' and [creditors] are going
to give you lots of evidence about how bad the debtor is and how bad the debtor has
been historically." Roundtable Discussion, Good Faith: A Roundtable Discussion, l AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 11, 23 (1993).
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she ever came before the court and end the inquiry (if there are indeed
any limits on the breadth of this analysis) outside the Code and even
beyond the law altogether.
The cases that undertake a broad good faith in,quiry are many and
varied. Because the courts which undertake this inquiry recognize no
organizing principle (at least none that imposes limits narrower than the
broad laundry lists given above), superficial patterns in these cases are
somewhat difficult to discern. Nevertheless, patterns do exist. Three
distinct issues emerge as primary inquiries in the broad good faith
analysis and surface as primary motivators in these courts' :dulings.
These inquiries include: the debtor's pre-plan conduct, the potential
Chapter 7 dischargeability of debts, and potential abuse of the formal
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

a.

Pre-Plan Conduct

Many of the cases employing the broad good faith analysis examine
the debtor's pre-plan conduct. While conduct could be pre-plan but
post-petition in theory, scrutiny of this element in practice almost always
involves inquiry into conduct before the petition was filed. Even courts
sympathetic to the broad good faith analysis may question whether a
court can consider pre-petition conduct. 124 Nevertheless, the broad
good faith courts do ask: What kind of conduct gave rise to the claims
the debtor seeks to discharge in Chapter 13?
If the language of the cases is to be believed, courts which examine
pre-filing conduct do so cautiously. Some courts note that pre-filing
conduct is only one of several considerations in their good faith
analysis. 125 Other courts warn that it should not be the only factor
considered. 126 Thus the issue of pre-filing conduct is sometimes
considered only one of the relevant issues.
The Sixth Circuit's approach to good faith is typical of the courts'
approach to examining pre-filing conduct. In its opinion in In re
Doersam, 127 the Court manages to avoid holding that pre-petition
conduct. is relevant to the good faith inquiry while basing its opinion on

124. See In re Lilley, 185 B.R. 489 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995).
.
125. 550 West Ina Rd. Trust v. Tucker (In re Tucker), 989 F.2d 328 (9th Cir.
1993); In re Lilley, 185 B.R. 489 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1Q95); In re Elisade, 172 B.R. 996
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994); In re Carver, 110 B.R. 305 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); In re
Davis, 68 B.R. 205 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986).
126. Metro Employees Credit Union v. Okoreeh-Baah (In re Okoreeh-Baah), 836
F.2d 1030 (6th Cir. 1988).
.
127. State of Ohio, Student Loan Comm'n v. Doersam (In re Doersam), 849 F.2d
237 (6th Cir. 1988).
'
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the principle that it is. The op1mon quotes dicta from a previous
decision with approval, clearly giving the courts license to inquire into
pre-plan condu~t:
Obviously, the liberal provisions of the new Chapter 13 are. subject to abuse,
and courts must look closely at the debtor's conduct before confirming a plan
. . . . The view that the Bankruptcy Court should not consider the debtor's preplan conduct in incurring the debt appears to give too narrow an interpretation
to the good faith requirement. 128

The Doersam opinion does not attempt to square its broad inquiry with
statutory language or Congressional intent (although, given the wild
claims about Congressional intent reviewed below, the court may have
avoided this discussion for the sake of judicial economy). More
interestingly, the opinion fails to explain against what standard it judges
the plan-good faith inquiry as "too narrow." The Court declines to
accept the prima facie meaning of the statute without explaining
why.129
The pre-plan conduct inquiry is, in essence, an investigation into how
the debt originated. The manner in which the. d~bt was incurred
certainly results in greater scrutiny. 130 The rationale for this inquiry
is that if the debt was incurred in bad faith, that factor might cause a
court to take an additional look at the question whether the plan was
proposed in good faith. For example, certain pre-plan conduct might
cause the court to determine that no plan could be filed in good faith
under any circumstances. 131 Some courts. have held that the bad faith
origin of a liability justifies the court in forcing a debtor to modify her

128. Id. at 239 (citing Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 43132 (6th-Cir. 1982) (citing In re Kull, 12 B.R. 654, 659 (D.C.S.D. Ga. 1981)).
129. There is another oddity which should be noted briefly and then left for another
more complete examination. This is the willingness of broad good faith courts to base
their analysis on authority which is not authoritative. The In re Doersam opinion bases
its holding on dicta from a previous case. Id. at 239. A court may be excused from
elevating its own dicta to ratio dicidendi. However, it is distressing that the referenced
authority was a federal district court in another circuit. Id. Although it is true that the
6th Circuit merely references the foreign case (appending a "see, e.g." tag), the district
court case is still the only authority which is cited for the proposition that the "plan good
faith" analysis is too narrow. Id. Particularly in the absence of any attempt to cite a
close reading of the statute or legislative history, this weak citation highlights the void
of authority. For a more extreme example of this conduct, see infra note 159.
130. In re Sotter, 28 B.R. 201 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1983) (emphasizing that the
genesis of major debt was criminal conduct).
·
131. See Schaffner v. I.R.S., 95 B.R. 62 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988).
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plan to make full payment of her debt, and if the debtor refuses, then
justifies the court in lifting the stay. 132 Other courts boldly state that
no plan will be confirmed whose confirmation would result in discharge
of debts incurred by intentional fraud 133--although this restriction is
absent from § 1325(a)(3).
Courts are not alone in basing their good faith analysis on the origin
of liability in pre-plan conduct. Scholars do the same. The language
from one article is typical: "The discharge of debts which result from
illegal activity is not consistent with the meaning of good faith or the
intent of Congress to provide a remedy to adjust debts for the honest but
unfortunate debtor." 134 This argument is patently circular. According
to this argument, the meaning of "good faith" in the statute cannot mean
what the statute says-i.e., good faith in proposing the plan. The
meaning of good faith must therefore depend on what Congress intended
(rather than what Congress explicitly wrote in the statute). The
argument then asserts that the discharge of the particular kind of liability
at issue cannot be consistent with "good faith" because the writer
interprets Congressional intent to be something other than what is stated
in the statute. This argument begins and ends with a denial of the words
of the statute. Of course, neither courts nor writers cite any textual
authority for this argument, because circular arguments are, by definition, self-referential.
In the consideration of pre-filing conduct, the courts' behavior differs
significantly from the cautious approach they espouse. Courts claim to
approach pre-filing conduct judiciously, considering it as only one of
many factors in determining good faith. However, the results belie this
claim of restraint. Almost without exception, when courts examine prefiling conduct, this conduct determines the outcome of their analysis.

b.

Non-dischargeability of the Liability in Chapter 7

When discussing pre-plan conduct, courts often refer to conduct which
would have barred discharge had the case been filed in Chapter 7. In
Doersam, for example, the court takes special note of "whether the debt
would be non-dischargeable under Chapter 7 [as] a factor which is

132. In re Baez, 106 B.R. 16 (Bankr. D. P.R. 1989).
133. In re Kem II, 40 B.R. 26 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1984); In re Terry, 9 B.R. 314
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1981).
134. Daniel G. Chadwick, In re Prine: Good Faith, Dischargeability and
Conversion.from a Chapter 7 to a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, 19 IDAHO L. REV. 115, 120
(1983).
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relevant to the determination of good faith." 135 The court, like the
scholar previously cited, may focus on debts which arise from illegality,
which are nondischargeable in Chapter 7 through the provisions of
§ 523(a). Such considerations are typical of the courts undertaking a
broad good faith analysis.
Courts undertaking a broad good faith analysis argue that
"nondischargeable debts", 136 which are the kind of debts for which a
Chapter 13 discharge is sought, would not be discharged in a Chapter 7
action: Therefore, these debts should not be discharged in a Chapter 13
action. This argument begins with the assertion that the purpose of
Chapter 13 is repayment, not discharge. To justify this assertion the
courts often refer to the legislative history, in the guise of a quotation
from one of the many sources of legislative intent:
The new chapter 13 ... provide[s] a simple yet precise and effective system for
individuals to pay debts under bankruptcy court protection and supervision. The
new chapter 13 will permit almost any individual . . . to propose and have
approved a reasonable plan for debt repa~ent . . . . As in current law, 100
percent payment plans will be encouraged. 137

The legislative history is voluminous; proof that the legislative intent
was to require payment need not have been made by the quoted
language. Many other portions of the legislative history might have
been chosen to exemplify this argument. 138 However, asserting that

135. State of Ohio, Student Loan Comm'n v. Doersam (In re Doersam), 849 F.2d
237, 239, 240 (6th Cir. 1988).
136. Although these opinions-and even dissenting court's opinions---refer to
"nondischargeable" claims, these claims are in fact not nondischargeable in Chapter 13.
Non-dischargeability in Chapter 7 is based on the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)
(1996), imported by 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1995) into Chapter 7. The same 11 U.S.C
§ 523(a) exceptions to discharge are absent from the Chapter 13 section on discharge,
11 U.S.C. § 1328(1994). 11 U.S.C. § 523 is not completely absent, however; 11 U.S.C.
§ 1328(a)(2) refers to specific subsections as excepted from the Chapter 13 discharge.
Clearly Congress did not forget about 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) when it wrote 11 U.S.C.
§ 1328; members of Congress merely chose not to except from Chapter 13 discharge
most of what was nondischargeable in Chapter 7. Therefore these claims are not
nondischargeable in the Chapter 13 context.
137. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 13 (1978), reprinted in 1978 A.S.C.C.A.N. 5787
[hereinafter S.R. 989].
138. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 118 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963 [hereinafter H.R. 595] (''The purpose of Chapter 13 is to enable an
individual . . . to develop and perform under a plan for the repayment of his debts over
an extended period. In some cases, the plan will call for repayment. In others, it may
offer creditors a percentage of their claims in full settlement."); S.R. 989, supra note
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these passages represent the sum total of "legislative intent" ignores
contrary provisions which would prove that the intent of Congress was
not to secure payment for the creditor but rather to secure a broad
discharge 139 or a fresh start for the debtor. 140
Whatever the basis for the nondischargeability argument in legislative
history, the courts emphasize that debtors should not be able to use
Chapter 13 to discharge what is nondischargeable in Chapter 7 .. For this
reason, the type of debt which a Chapter 13 debtor seeks to discharge 1s
germane to the question of good faith. 141 If the debts sought to be
discharged in Chapter 13 are found to be nondischargeable under chapter
7, the Chapter 13 action will probably be found to have been filed in
bad faith. Thus, Chapter 13 is held not to be properly used for the sole
purpose of discharging "nondischargeable debt." 142 This is particularly
true if the nondischargeable act approaches the level of an intentional

137, at 141 ("Chapter 13 is designed to serve as a flexible vehicle fodhe repayment of
part or all of the allowed claims of the debtor"); S.R. 989, supra note 137, at 12 ("In
theory, the basic purpose of Chapter XIII has been to permit an individual to pay his
debts and avoid [liquidation or straight] bankruptcy by making periodic payments to a
trustee under bankruptcy court protection, with the trustee fairly distributing the funds
deposited to creditors until all debts have been paid.").
139. For example, tucked into the provisions on Liquidation for the Consumer
Debtor is the language: "In reorganization and individual repayment plan cases, the
existence of circumstances that would bar discharge, such as misconduct or the six-year
bar, will not be a bar to confirmation of a plan." R.R. 595, supra note 138, at 129. A
footnote further elucidates this sentence by referring to ''proposed 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129,
1141, 1325, 1328." Id. This language, particularly with the clarifying footnote, makes
it clear that Congress intended that 11 U.S.C. § 523 not apply to Chapter 13.
Furthermore, the House Report describes discharge as "[p]erhaps the most important
element of the fresh start for a consumer debtor after bankruptcy". R.R. 595, supra note
138, at 128. The House Report notes that "the discharge, with the release from creditor
collection attempts," is one of the most important aspects of the fresh start. Id. at 125.
140. See, e.g., R.R. 595, supra note 138, at 118 ("[B]ankruptcy relief should be
effective, and should provide the debtor with a fresh start."); id. ("[T]he debtor is given
adequate exemptions and other protection to ensure that bankruptcy will provide a fresh
start"); id. at 125 ("The two most important aspects of the fresh start available under the
Bankruptcy laws are the provision of adequate property for a return to normal life, and
the discharge, with the release from creditor collection attempts," id. at 126 ("[T]here
is a Federal interest in seeing that a debtor that goes through bankruptcy comes out with
adequate possessions to begin his fresh start. . . . Thus, the bill . . . enunciates a
bankruptcy policy favoring a fresh start'').
·
141. See State of Ohio, Student Loan Comm'n v. Doersam (In re Doersam), 849
F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1988). See also Circle Management Services, Inc. v. Wright (In re
Wright) 36 B.R. 663 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984) (finding that if the debtor meets the
minimum statutory requirements, her good faith is not determined by her contribution,
and that the nature of her debts must be considered only if nominal repayment is
contemplated).
142. In re Schaitz, 913 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1990).
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tort or criminal activity. 143 A minority of courts claim that the
nondischargeability issue is only one of many factors to be considered,
and is not, therefore, conclusive evidence of bad faith. 144 For most
broad good faith courts, however, if there is an intent to discharge debt
under Chapter 13 which would be nondischargeable under Chapter 7, the
plan will likely be found to have been filed in bad faith. 145 The courts
which dissent from this position represent a very small minority. 146

c.

Abuse of Provisions of the Code

When courts engaging in a broad good faith inquiry examine prepetition conduct and the potential Chapter 7 dischargeability of debts,
they stray from the field apparently prescribed by the explicit words of
the Bankruptcy Code. Yet these examinations maintain some loose
nexus with bankruptcy law. Many courts, however, further assert that
the very election by a debtor of Chapter 13 's provisions can be an abuse

143. For examples of garden variety nondischargeable debt, see In re Schaitz, 913
F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Ross, 95 B.R. 509 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); In re Olp,
29 B.R. 932 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1983). For examples of criminal and tortious conduct,
see Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 898 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1990); In re Thomas,
118 B.R. 421 (Bankr. D. S.C. 1990); In re Kourtakis, 75 B.R. 183 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1987); In re Todd, 65 B.R. 249 (Bankr. N.D.111. 1986); In re Brock, 47 B.R. 167 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1985); for examples of fraud -0r misrepresentation, see Pioneer Bank of
Longhart v. Rasmusen (In re Rasmussen), 888 F.2d 703 (10th Cir. 1989); In re Boyd,
57 B.R. 410 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983); In re Troyer, 24 B.R. 727 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1982).
144. See Hardin v. Caldwell (In re Caldwell), 895 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1990); In re
Doersam, 849 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1988); In re Vensel, 39 B.R. 866 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1984); In re Ali, 33 B.R. 890 (Bankr. D.Kan. 1983) (retreating from In re McMinn, 4
B.R. 150 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980) and In re Garcia, 6 B.R. 35 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980)); In
re Miller, 24 B.R. 786 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); In re Graves, 19 B.R. 402 (Bankr. La.
1982); In re Minor,16 B.R. 147 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); In re Meltzer, 11 B.R. 624
(Bankr. N.Y. 1981); U.S. Life Credit v. Carter (In re Carter), 9 B.R. 140 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1981); G.F.C. Consumer Discount Co. v. Scott (In re Scott), 7 B.R. 692 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1980).
145. See In re Lilley, 185 B.R. 489 (Bankr. D. Pa. 1995); In re Smith, 848 F.2d.
813 (7th Cir. 1988); Neufeld v. Freeman, 794 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1986), on remand In
re Freeman, 66 B.R. 610 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986).
146. For such opinions, see .In re Chaffin, 836 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1988); In re
Farley, 114 B.R. 711 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990); In re Belt, 106 B.R. 553 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 1989); In re Riggleman, 76 B.R. 111 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987); In re Kem, 40 B.R.
26 (Bankr. D. N.Y. 1984); Overland Park Dodge, Inc. v. Graff(In re Graff), 7 B.R. 426
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
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of the purposes of the Code. These courts provide the greatest insight
into what motivates the broad good faith courts.
The "abuse of the provisions of the Code" reasoning must be carefully
distinguished from the examination by the plan good faith courts of the
debtor's conduct within bankruptcy. The plan good faith courts examine
how the debtor treated the procedures and requirements of the Code and
the directives of the bankruptcy court. They conclude that an uncooperative debtor may lack the good faith required by the Code. The "abuse
of the provisions of the Code" courts assert that the act of electing the
remedies of Chapter 13 is itself evidence of bad faith.
This odd assertion shares one key presumption with the pre-plan
conduct analysis and nondischargeability arguments: that the statute
cannot mean what it appears to say. The broad good faith courts argue
that the statute could not have meant that the courts must ignore conduct
prior to the proposal of the plan, nor that Congress intended to allow the
discharge of liability under one chapter which would be
nondischargeable under another section. It is but a small further step to
argue that although the Code permits a Chapter 13 discharge, election of
the discharge is an abuse of the Code.
Many courts explicitly refer to Chapter 7 iti determining that the filing
of Chapter 13 was abusive, and therefore, not made in good faith. These
courts reason that an abuse of the Code occurs when a debtor attempts
to use the provisions of Chapter 13 as a substitute for the provisions of
Chapter 7----at least, when the principal motive is to circumvent
exceptions to discharge rather than make meaningful payments 147 of
debt. 148 Courts espousing this view take particular umbrage when they
believe that the Chapter 13 action was filed to avoid the restrictions of
Chapter 7. 149

147. The "meaningful payments" language reflects a long-standing and energetic
debate about whether a debtor had to pay a certain percentage of his unsecured debt in
order to reach the "good faith" threshold. Courts mandating certain percentages fell
within the broad good faith c~p, both in their willingness to read this requirement into
the Code, and in their unwillingness to read the Code's Chapter 13 discharge provisions
literally. Congress, however, resolved the debate by amending 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) in
1984, to provide a payment standard.
The "meaningful payments" requirement, although apparently contrary to it, is clearly
an addition to the Code. Nevertheless, for a reasoned and sympathetic apology for
inserting the requirement, see In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. 256 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980)
(examining several zero payment Chapter 13 plans and arguing that the Code, as drafted,
. is out of balance because creditors are not represented and that the court, by ''reading
in" necessary requirements, must bring the Code back into balance).
148. In re Satterwhite, 7 B.R 39 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980).
149. See, e.g., In re Jacobs, 102 B.R. 239 (Bankr. E.D. Ok. 1988); In re Meltzer,
11 B.R. 624 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1981).
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Other courts simply posit that the use of Chapter 13 's broad discharge
provisions is a manipulation of the ''technicalities" of the Code and
therefore not made in good faith. These courts argue that good faith
requires more than technical compliance with the statute. These courts
require of the debtor good faith and honesty of purpose. They focus on
the debtor's state of mind. 1so These courts, therefore, feel themselves
entitled to weigh the true intention of the debtor against the literal
reading of the statute. When a literal application of "best interests of
creditors" test would result in the discharge of a substantial obligation,
these courts feel justified in ignoring the literal provisions of the
statute. 1s1 Where a Chapter 13 action was used to execute a "real
purpose" of giving the debtors the opportunity to spread attorney fee
payments over sixteen months, the court held that election of Chapter 13
was "an abuse of the spirit and purpose" of the chapter despite the
debtor's compliance with the words of the Code. 1s2 "[W]here [a]
debtor's primary and overriding purpose [was] to manipulate Chapter 13
as a device to escape nearly all of his liability," a Chapter 13 plan
should not, according to these courts, be confirmed, even if the debtor
fulfilled the "technical requirements" of the statute. 1s3 The technically
correct use of Chapter 13 in such a way that the plan violates the
underlying policy of "securing an orderly and fair adjustment of the
relationship between debtor and creditors" does not satisfy the good faith
requirement. 154
The broad good faith courts have traveled far beyond what the statute
authorizes. Admittedly, the conduct of some debtors has been so abusive
of bankruptcy protection as to give the courts some excuse for this
expansive inquiry. In one case, the debtors used Chapter 13 for the
"greedy and unworthy purpose" of rejecting an option agreement they
felt was not sufficiently profitable. 1ss The court understandably found

150. In re Hawes, 73 B.R. 584 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987).
151. In re Sotter, 28 B.R. 201 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1983).
152. In re San Miguel, 40 B.R. 481, 485, 486 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1984).
153. In re Norman, 162 B.R. 581, 583 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
154. In re Elisade, 172 B.R. 996, 1000 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) (quoting Northwest
Place Ltd. v. Cooper (In re Northwest Place Ltd.), 108 B.R. 809, 815 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1988)) (emphasis omitted).
'
155. Shell Oil Co. v. Waldron (In re Waldron), 785 F.2d 936, 941 (11th Cir. 1986),
cert. dismissed, 478 U.S. 1028 (1986).
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that stratagem to demonstrate a lack of good faith, although the technical
requirements of the statute were arguably fulfilled. 156
Most often, however, the courts label as "abuse" a use of the statute
to reach an end disapproved by the court. A Chapter 13 debtor's
attempt to avoid a large debt to a former employer that resulted from
"betrayal of a close personal relationship," breach of trust and felonious
conduct was considered to be an unfair manipulation of the code, ~57
even though § 1325(a) allows the discharge of these very claims.
The proposition that a person manipulates a statute by electing to do
what the statute on its face and by its history specifically allows, is
shocking. What motivates a court of law to take such an extreme
position? A search for the real motivating principle in the broad good
faith cases reveals that beneath the surface discussions of pre-plan
conduct, dischargeability, or abuse of the provisions of the Code, lies the
court's moral judgement of the debtor and an expression of its moral
outrage.
What is truly at issue in these cases is whether or not the judge is
outraged by the debtor's actions prior to seeking bankruptcy protection.
In cases in which an act is so reprehensible that the court refuses to be
a party to discharge the liability, the court searches for an excuse in the
debtor's past and then justifies its decision in "good faith" terms, without
regard to compliance with the statute. In In re LeMaire, 158 the Eighth
Circuit reacts so violently to a liability that arose from an intentional
shooting that it vents its outrage several times in the opinion. In
overturning a district court's :finding of "good faith," the court refers,
without being specific, to trial evidence, public policy, pre-plan conduct,
and the maliciousness of the injury. The court fails to explain how the
Code authorizes inquiry into these factors in the good faith analysis. 159

156. Id.
157. In re Sitarz, 150 B.R. 710, 725 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993).
158. Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 898 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1990).
159. Id. at 1348, 1349. The Lemaire opinion provides a fascinating example of the
court's willingness to rely on authority which is not authoritative. See discussion supra
note 129. The LeMaire court apparently faced a quandary between a debtor whom the
court was not willing to allow to pass over the "good faith" hurdle, and the court's own
precedent which appeared to prevent the application of a broad good faith inquiry. The
Eighth Circuit's own opinion in In re Estus countenanced the laundry list/totality of the
circumstances approach. 695 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1982). The "totality of circumstances"
approach would have made the denial of good faith easier for the LeMaire court. The
court, however, could not easily use Estus. In re Lemaire, 898. F.2d at 1349. After
Estus, in 1984, Congress amended 11 U.S.C. § 1325, adding§ 1325(b). Id. The Eighth
Circuit followed the amendment with its opinion in Education Assistance Corp. v.
Zellner (In re Zellner), 827 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987). Zellner held that the effect of
the statutory amendment was to limit the focus of the Estus inquiry to a plan good faith
inquiry: i.e., whether the d~btor stated his financial condition accurately, whether she

470

[VOL.34: 439, 1997]

Chapter 13
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

The Court of Appeal's lengthy and detailed dissent emphasizes that the
majority's claims are hollow and lack foundation in bankruptcy history,
legal precedent, or in the wording of the statute. This dissent makes the
majority's rush to judgment all the more obvious.
The Eighth Circuit is not alone in acting on its outrage by failing to
find "good faith." In In re Caldwell, 160 the Sixth Circuit scolded a
debtor who tried to discharge a judgment arising from false arrest,
malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment. The opinion overflows
with moral outrage, speaking of chapter 13 as a "salvation,"161 while
contrasting the debtor's "veiled" intentions 162 and his ''unbroken
pattern of deceit and delay." 163 The opinion ends with an emphatic
moral judgment: "Caldwell is not the type ofdebtor whom the bankruptcy laws were meant to protect."164 The court based its finding of bad
faith, in part, on thid debtor's noncooperation with bankruptcy procedure; but the determinative factor was "what he has done since the
judgment to avoid paying it." 165
The outrage evident in these opinions is best exemplified bl the Sixth
Circuit's statements in Memphis Bank & Trust v. Whitman: 1
Obviously the liberal provisions of the new Chapter 13 are subject to abuse, and
courts must look closely at the debtor's conduct before confirming a plan. We
should not allow a debtor to obtain money, services or products from a seller
by larceny, fraud or other forms of dishonesty and then keep his gain by filing
a Chapter 13 petition within a few days of the wrong. To allow the debtor to

engaged in fraud or misrepresentation in the bankruptcy court, and so forth. Id. at 1227.
Thus, if the Eighth Circuit were to follow its own opinion in Zellner, it would find it
more difficult to withhold a "good faith" finding to LeMaire. The court avoids this
difficulty through the judicial equivalent of a half gainer with a double twist: the
LeMaire opinion cites a Seventh Circuit interpretation of the Eighth Circuit's own
Zellner opinion to prove that Zellner actually preserved the "totality of the circumstances" approach that in fact Zellner actually disapproved. In re LeMaire, 898 F.2d at 1349
(citing In re Smith, 848 F.2d 813, 820 n.8 (7th Cir. 1988)). Thus, in essence, the Eighth
Circuit relies on a misinterpretation of its own precedent by another circuit court of
appeals in order to invalidate its own precedent. In one way or another, these are the
kinds of gymnastics which the broad good faith courts often exhibit.
160. Caldwell v. Hardin (In re Caldwell), 895 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1990).
161. Id. at 1126.
·162. Id.
163. Id. at 1127.
164. Id. at 1128 (emphasis added).
165. Id. at 1127.
166. 692 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1982).
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profit from his own wrong In this way through the Chapter 13 process runs the
risk of turning otherwise honest consumers and shopkeepers into knaves. 161

The courts must not only protect the Code and their jurisdiction, but
must also, apparently protect the debtors from their own evil inclination
toward sin and knavery.
These courts are not isolated proponents of a discredited philosophy.
Courts across the country and from different circuits have transformed
their outrage over the acts giving rise to liability into justification for a
finding of bad faith. 168 Judges are not shy about admitting that their
outrage is a significant factor; the occasional judge will reveal his
reasoning outside the scope of a written opinion. 169
Although the broad good faith analysis is the dominant approach, and
the "abuse of the Code" justification is a strong theme within that
analysis, a few courts dissent from it. These courts maintain that a debtor
may file a plan which fulfills the good faith requirement, even though
debts were incurred by pre-petition bad faith. 170 A few judges remind
their colleagues that a court should not let reprehensible conduct distract
it from its analysis of whether there is good faith in proposing the plan.
One opinion warns: "Care must be taken not to allow revulsion over a
debtor's past deeds to detract from or impair a finding of good faith

167. Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
168. See In re Kourtakis, 75 B.R. 183 (Banlcr. E.D. Mich. 1987) (finding that debtor
does not demonstrate requisite honesty of intentions given nature of criminal act giving
rise to the liability); In re Brock, 47 B.R. 167 (Banlcr. S.D. Cal. 1985) (noting that the
motivation of debtor was to escape the consequences of repayment, and, in apparent
contradistinction, that the Code is intended to relieve the "honest debtor''); In re Troyer,
24 B.R. 727 (Banlcr. N.D. Ohio 1982) (basing a "lack of good faith" ruling on language
about the "dishonest debtor," as though pre-petition conduct proved that the debtor was
in some continuing way dishonest and, therefore had not earned a finding of good faith).
169. In a discussion about Chapter 11 good faith, bankruptcy judge William
Greendyke said that bad faith is "a matter of how offended the bankruptcy judge is that
these parties are in front of him or her and whether or not the judge decides that the case
is one that is susceptible of reorganization." Roundtable Discussion, Good Faith: A
Roundtable Discussion, I AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 11, 23 (1993). Judge Greendyke
then reviewed the laundry list of factors prescribed for the good faith analysis----one not
dissimilar from the Chapter 13 list--ruid concluded: "If the case is so egregious, if you
will, that one factor outweighs all the others, you just need to consider all the remaining
factors or to look at their potential application to make sure of your decision. It is
appropriate to give different weight to the various factors." Id. at 24. As noted above,
it is commonly said that the good faith requirement in Chapter 11 is essentially the same
as in Chapter 13. There is no reason to believe that this judge's opinion is immaterial
here, nor that his opinion is particularly radical. None of the other panelists objected to
his remarks as being extraordinary. Id. passim.
I 70. In re Eppers, 38 B.R. 301 (Banlcr. N.M. 1984); Margrafv. Oliver, 28 B.R. 420
(Banlcr. S.D. Ohio 1983). See also United States v. Verdunn, 187 B.R. 996 (Banlcr.
M.D. Fla. 1995), rev'd, 89 F. 3d 799 (11th Cir. 1996); In re Lilley, 185 B.R. 489
(Banlcr. E.D. Pa. 1995).
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where that debtor is making an effort to satisfy past obligations to the
extent possible and still embark upon a fresh start." 171 More concisely,
one court notes the tortured interpretations mentioned above and
pointedly remarks: "This Court's dissatisfaction with the result [of a plan
good faith analysis] is not a sufficient ground to support a conclusion
that the debtor's plan is not proposed in good faith." 172
Nevertheless, the broad good faith analysis remains the majority
approach. The words of the statute do not limit these courts' approach.
Pre-plan conduct, nondischargeability, and abuse of the Code are all laid
open to the broad good faith courts' inquiry.

Iv.

OUT OF THE CODE AND INTO MORALITY

The broad good faith courts undertake a broad inquiry into the
debtor's conduct and intentions. I shall first examine the inquiry itself,
and in particular the moral language used by these courts. Next, because
the bankruptcy courts often claim that the authority for their actions
arises from their status as courts of equity, I consider the traditional
orientation of courts of equity. Finally, I examine the purposes of a
code and the role of predictability in commercial law, and ask whether
the broad good faith courts satisfy these purposes.

A. A Moral Inquiry
What connects pre-plan conduct, nondischargeability in Chapter 7,
abuse of the provisions of the Code, and outrage over pre-plan conduct?
Something must, for these considerations characterize the analysis of
courts which seem driven to find a lack of good faith. What distinguishes these considerations from considerations of good faith in proposing
the plan itself? Again, something must distinguish the two different sets
of considerations, because courts which consider the first set of factors
seldom invoke deficiencies in the plan itself.
In fact, the distinction between broad good faith and plan good faith
has remarkable implications. One would expect that courts applying

171. In re Chura, 33 B.R. 558, 560 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983). See also In re Belt,
106 B.R. 553, 565 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (citing In re Chura, 33 B.R. 558, 560, and
adding the caution that "[o]nly where there is a showing of serious debtor misconduct
or abuse should a chapter 13 case be found lacking good faith.").
172. In re Farley, 114 B.R. 711,716 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990).
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neutral principles to the same statute would reach roughly similar results.
Yet this is not the case. An examination of the case law reveals that a
court that approaches a Chapter 13 plan with a broad good faith strategy
is almost twice as likely to find a lack of good faith as is a court which
applies a plan good faith inquiry. 173
There are various possible hypotheses that might elucidate an
organizing principle. One hypothesis is that the cases exhibit successive
waves of interpretation and reaction, and thus the real explanation behind
these cases is an historical one. 174 Another theory is that there is a
disagreement not over the meaning of good faith, but rather over
whether the "manifest intent" of the statute is repayment, 175 dis173. The results of the two different approaches are startling. In the approximately
200 cases reviewed by the author, see supra note 9, where courts adopted a broad good
faith approach, they declined to find that the Chapter 13 plan was proposed in good faith
in 87% of the cases. Yet where courts adopted a plan good faith approach, they declined
to find good faith in only 46% of the cases. These are preliminary findings which must
await a formal statistical analysis. Of course, the normal disclaimers about statistical
sampling must apply.
174. There seem to be three distinct epochs. In the beginning, the courts read the
statute closely and interpreted it literally. See, e.g., Johnson v. Vanguard Holding Corp.
(In re Johnson), 708 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1983) ("(W]here the statute is silent, courts
should not read into the Act any per se limitations...."); Deans v. O'Donnell, 692 F.2d
968 (4th Cir. 1982); Barnes v. Whelan, 689 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Ravenot v.
Rimgale (In re Rimgale), 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir. 1982). This gave way to a period
during the middle and late l980's in which courts espoused the broad good faith inquiry
in order to stop perceived abuses of the statute. See, e.g., State of Ohio, Student Loan
Comm'n v. Doersam (In re Doersam), 849 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1988). This period in tum
seems to be slowly giving way to confusion, a confusion in which a minority of courts
have retreated to the words of the statute. This minority is lead by cases such as In re
Farley, 114 B.R. 711 (Banlcr. S.D. Cal. 1990), buttressed by language in recent Supreme
Court banlcruptcy rulings: Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991), Toibb v.
Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991), and Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992).
This historical/evolutionary description does not explain, however, why some courts
continue to cling to the broad good faith inquiry at its most radical. Many cases, even
after the clear "strict construction" message sent by the recent Supreme Court cases,
continue the broad good faith analysis. See, e.g., In re Allard, 196 B.R. 402 (Banlcr.
N.D. Ill. 1996) (continuing the broad good faith analysis contrary to the statute, years
after the Supreme Court indicated that such an extra-statutory approach was inappropriate). See also In re Norman, 162 B.R. 581 (Banlcr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
175. For support for the proposition that Congress' main intent in the Banlcruptcy
Code was to require (or allow) repayment of the debtor's debts, see H.R. 595, supra note
138, at ll8 ("The purpose of Chapter 13 is to enable an individual ... to develop and
perform under a plan for the repayment of his debts over an extended period. In some
cases, the plan will call for full repayment. In others, it may offer creditors a percentage
of their claims in full settlement."); S. R. 989, supra note 137, at 141 ("Chapter 13 is
designed to serve as a flexible vehicle for the repayment of part or all of the allowed
claim of the debtor."); id. at 12 ("In theory, the basic purpose of Chapter XIII has been
to permit an individual to pay his debts and avoid [liquidation or straight] banlcruptcy
by making periodic payments to a trustee under banlcruptcy court protection, with the
trustee fairly distributing the funds deposited to creditors until all debts have been
paid."); id. at 13 ("The new chapter 13 ... provide[s] a simple yet precise and effective
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charge, 176 or even a fresh start. 177 From this vantage point, the underlying conflict in the cases could be understood as resulting from
different interpretations of legislative history. 178 A cynic might
maintain that the true debate is over ends and means: If the end
produced by a literal reading of the statute is abhorrent, can the court

system for individuals to pay debts under bankruptcy court protection and supervision.
The new chapter 13 will permit almost any individual ... to propose and have approved
a reasonable plan for debt repayment . . . . As in current law, 100 percent payment
plans will be encouraged.").
I 76. For support for the proposition that Congress' principal intention was to grant
the debtor a broad discharge, see H.R. 595, supra note 138, at 129 ("In reorganization
and individual repayment plan cases, the existence of circumstances that would bar
discharge, such as misconduct or the six year bar, will not be a bar to confirmation of
a plan.") Id. at 129 n. 71 (proving by the language of this footnote, which refers to
"proposed 11 U.S.C. [§§] 1129, 1141, 1325, 1328," and which is tucked into provisions
on Liquidation for the Consumer Debtor, that the statute meant precisely what it says:
that 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) provisions were not to apply in Chapter 13); id. at 128 ("Perhaps
the most important element of the fresh start for a consumer debtor after bankruptcy is
discharge."); id. at 125 ("The two most important aspects of the fresh start available
under the Bankruptcy laws are the provision of adequate property for a return to normal
life, and the discharge, with the release from creditor collection attempts.").
177. For support for the proposition that the actual intention of Congress was to
procure a fresh start for the debtor, see H.R 595, supra note 138, at 118 ("[B]ankruptcy
relief should be effective, and should provide the debtor with a fresh start."); id. "[T]he
debtor is given adequate exemptions and other protection to ensure that bankruptcy will
provide a fresh start."); id. at 125 ("The two most important aspects of the fresh start
available under the Bankruptcy laws are the provision of adequate property for a return
to normal life, and the discharge, with the release from creditor collection attempts.");
id. at 126 ("[T]here is a Federal interest in seeing that a debtor that goes through
bankruptcy comes out with adequate possessions to begin his fresh start."); id. (''Thus,
the bill ... enunciates a bankruptcy policy favoring a fresh start.").
178. One of the most interesting parts of the debate is that the actual nonexistence
of legislative history as an authoritative text is never mentioned. The content of
legislative history is discussed; the primacy or exclusivity of different themes is debated;
various portions of the legislative record are contrasted against other arguably weaker
portions. Yet nobody mentions that which is obvious throughout the review of the
legislative history: that there is no unified, ·internally consistent text which "is"
legislative history. The House and Senate reports are each internally inconsistent and
mutually contradictory. Portions of each report concurrently support opposing positions
while also supporting third positions. This cannot be surprising, because the legislative
history, like the statute itself, is the product of legislative compromise and bargaining,
and the scars of these battles and their resolutions appear in the legislative reports.
Nevertheless, as a practical matter, legislative history does not exist to resolve the "intent
of Congress" debate, nor to provide an answer to the question: What is good faith? Its
nonexistence, however, does not prevent it from being cited.
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vary the interpretation of the plain words of the statute 179 or must it
defer to the legislature? 180
None of these hypotheses, however, answer the question of what
motivates the broad good faith courts in their acrobatic attempts to deny
a good faith finding. Talcing the language of the broad good faith
opinions seriously, the conclusion that morality is what drives the broad
good faith inquiry is difficult to avoid. 181 Both the broad good faith

179. For the leading exponent of this view, see Memphis Bank & Trust v. Whitman,
in which the Sixth Circuit in 1982 wrote:
[T]his subsection[§ 1352(a)(3)] says only that the wage earner plan must be
'proposed' in good faith, not that the debt in question be incurred in good
faith .... The 'good faith' requirement is neither defined in the Bankruptcy
Code nor discussed in the legislative history. The phrase should, therefore, be
interpreted in light of the structure and general purposes of Chapter 13.
Obviously the liberal provisions of the new Chapter 13 are subject to abuse,
and courts must look closely at the debtor's conduct before confirming a plan.
We should not allow a debtor to obtain money, services or products from a
seller by larceny, fraud or other forms of dishonesty and then keep his gain by
filing a Chapter 13 petition within a few days of the wrong. To allow the
debtor to profit from his own wrong in this way through the Chapter 13
process runs the risk of turning otherwise honest consumers and shopkeepers
into knaves. The view that the Bankruptcy Court should not consider the
debtor's pre-plan conduct in incurring the debt appears to give too narrow an
interpretation to the good faith requirement.
692 F.2d 427,431, 432. See also In re Boyd, 57 B.R. 410,411 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983)
("Congress [did] not wish the Bankruptcy Code to be a haven for criminal offenders and
has stated that the criminal actions . . . may proceed under the exception granted by
§ 362(b)(l) to the automatic stay ....") .
.180. The most articulate proponent of restraint is In re Farley, in which the court
states:
As much as this Court believes that debts nondischargeable under Chapter 7
should be discharged under Chapter 13 only if paid through the plan, that is
for the Congress to provide, not the judiciary. . . . Notwithstanding the
convictions of this Court about the inequitable result which obtains in a case
such as this, this Court is compelled to conclude that the plan as proposed
should be confirmed .... This Court's dissatisfaction with the result is not a
sufficient ground to support a conclusion that the debtor's plan is not proposed
in good faith. It is for the Congress to redress what this Court perceives as a
flaw in the statutory scheme of Chapter 13.
114 B.R. 711, 715-16 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990).
As discussed supra note 174, three recent Supreme Court cases appear to support the
Farley position. See Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991); Toibb v.
Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991); Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992).
181. I do not wish to create a new school of legal analysis when I suggest that the
proper inquiry for aberrant opinions is not, "What does the law say?", but rather, "To
what use is a particular idea put?" On the one hand, the case study method taught in
law school presumes that courts used sound legal reasoning. Based on this premise, with
the process of reasoning rendered transparent, law students are encouraged to derive
rules from the cases. After law school, lawyers are seldom encouraged to ask whether
a particular line of reasoning ''makes sense." On the other hand, radical approaches to
the law, such as the Marxist and other ideologically based analyses, reach such absurd
results (in reaching for hidden agendas) that they thereby warn us of the danger of
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courts and the plan good faith courts, in their criticisms of their more
expansive colleagues, recognize that this is the real motivating factor.
The broad good faith courts' define good faith in terms saturated with
morality. Good faith is described as full and complete disclosure and
honesty of purpose. 182 The subjective intention of the debtor (not his
objective conduct) is one of the factors in the broad good faith
analysis, 183 and is often the only factor considered in judging good
faith. 184 Such courts do not find anything odd in describing the good
faith inquiry in terms that seem to leap out of the story of the expulsion
from Eden: ''the 'good faith' requirement of§ 1325(a) is the only safety
valve available through which plans attempting to twist the law to
malevolent ends may be cast out." 185
In fact, many of the broad good faith courts emphasize that they are
judging the debtor's moral status, not her objective conduct. These
courts rail against false intentions, deceit and delay, 186 frustration of

straying too far from this presumption of proper reasoning. Yet the presumption of
propriety does not help us to understand why a court might employ specious reasoning.
The functional approach that I suggest does answer this question because this approach
asks what motivates a court to pick a particular tool.
Take legislative history as an example. Random choice does not dictate that a broad
good faith court will choose a ''payment" portion of the congressional record, nor that
a plan good faith court will choose an equally authoritative "discharge" portion of the
record. Rather, these portions of the record are tools that build particular structures.
They are tools chosen specifically because they build a particular structure. The real
question, therefore, must be functional: What function does this particular piece (of
evidence, argument, or legislative history) serve in the court's reasoning? It is only
through this approach that one can understand the contortions of opinions like that of the
LeMaire court, supra notes 158, 159. Without such an approach to those tortured
decisions, one must either dismiss the opinions as aberrant or (even worse!) accept the
opinions as proper legal discourse. In either case, one cannot learn anything about what
motivates the courts or what deep structures might underlie apparently inexplicable
results.
182. In re Tobiason, 185 B.R. 59 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995); In re Graves, 19 B.R. 402
(Bankr. W.D. La. 1982); In re Wiggles, 7 B.R. 373 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
183. In re Stein, 36 B.R. 521 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983).
184. In re Schaitz, 913 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Fawcett, 758 F.2d 588 (11th
Cir. 1985); Johnson v. Vanguard Holding Corp. (In re Johnson), 708 F.2d 865 (2nd Cir.
1983); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Jenkins (In re Jenkins), 20 B.R. 642 (E.D. Ark. 1982);
Barnes v. Whelan, 689 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
185. Shell Oil Co. v. Waldron (In re Waldron), 785 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1986)
(quoting In re Leal, 7 B.R. 245, 248 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980)).
186. Caldwell v. Hardin (In re Caldwell), 895 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1990).
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fair dealing, 187 lack of remorse, 188 impenitence, 189 and of course,
knavery. 190
The clearest example of this expanding moral overlay is the "honest
debtor" language that inexplicably appears in the cases. Courts and
commentators often use the term "honest debtor," exclusively to deny
the blessings of "good faith" to a debtor. The assertion that only an
honest debtor qualifies for bankruptcy protection forms the basis of a
syllogism:
(A)
(B)
(C)

Bankruptcy is designed to protect an honest debtor;
The debtor is not an honest debtor if she attempts to discharge what
would be a nondischargeable liability (or discharge with minimum
payments, or whatever it is that the writer objects to);
Therefore, no matter what the statute says, the Bankruptcy statute can't
protect this debtor.

This reasoning appears in several cases, but always as subtext. Because
the phrase "honest debtor" is used with such authority, this writer
conducted an extensive review of the legislative history to determine its
origin.
The origin of the "honest debtor" is mysterious. The language may
have gained currency from Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 191 a 1934 Supreme
Court case interpreting the Bankruptcy Act:
One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to "relieve the honest
debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start
afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business
misfortunes." Williams v. U.S. Fidelity & G. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-555. This
purpose of the act has been again and again emphasized by the courts as being
of public as well as private interest. in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate
debtor who surrenders for distribution the property he owns at the time of
bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt. . . . The new
opportunity in life and the clear field for future effort, which it is the purpose
of the bankruptcy act to afford the emancipated debtor. . .. 192

187. In re Elisade, 172 B.R. 996 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994).
188. In re Kourtakis, 75 B.R. 183, 187 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987) ("[A]lthough
Kourtakis has some remorse, it is apparent from his testimony that the i:emorse is not
complete by any means.").
189. Id. ("Clearly, Kourtakis does not accept the full measure of the verdict against
him and has filed this bankruptcy in substantial part to effect a reduction of the verdict.
Kourtakis's intentions in this regard are thus not entirely honest.").
190. See Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427,431,432 (6th Cir.
1982), supra note 167 and accompanying text.
191. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
192. Id. at 244-245 (emphasis omitted).
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Numerous Code cases have adopted this argument. 193 Many writers
have also focussed on this language, alluding to "honest debtors" as
though it were a term originating with Congress:
Congress enacted Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Code) to
encourage the honest but unfortunate debtor to make greater use of composition
in bankruptcy. The framers of the Code intended to give the honest debtor a
fresh start by permitting the debtor to retain property while paying debts and to
avoid the stigma of a Chapter 7 liquidation. Although the Code permits the
honest debtor in Chapter 13 to accomplish these goals, certain provisions lend
themselves to ambiguous interpretation to the extent that Chapter 13 may be
used be used by the dishonest debtor to avoid payment of debts. 194

Both Code cases and legal writers, however, fail to specify the location
in the Code or in the Congressional debate where the requirement of a
debtor's "honesty" appears. There are two good reasons for this failure.
First, the Code does not contain the phrase; and second-to this writer's
chagrin after reading every word of the legislative history-the phrase
does not appear anywhere in the legislative history.
Why, then, do the courts and commentators find this concept so
attractive that they are willing to build their analyses on such chimerical
ground? The answer is shockingly simple. Each time the "honest
debtor'' language appears, it presages a broad good faith analysis and a
finding of "lack of good faith." Were the "honest debtor'' restriction to
exist, then it would be possible----or even easy--to limit the benefits of
the broad Chapter 13 discharge to debtors deemed "honest." Presumably, "honest debtors" would be those who have not offended the
presiding court's moral sensibility.
In the hindsight afforded by the "honest debtor" inquiry, we can
understand what drives the broad good faith courts. They bridle at the
possibility that unworthy debtors might achieve the benefits of Chapter
13. It is the moral status of the debtor (worthy or unworthy, honest or
dishonest), not the debtor's objectively observed conduct within the
bankruptcy court, that is at issue. Therefore, if the debtor is determined
to· be a member of the "suspect class" of "dishonest debtors," she can
more easily be denied the benefits of bankruptcy protection. The

193. See, e.g., In re Boyd, 57 B.R. 410 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983); In re Troyer, 24
B.R. 727 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982).
194. Daniel G. Chadwick, In re Prine: Good Faith, Dischargeability and Conversion
From a Chapter 7 to a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, 19 IDAHO L. REV. 115, 115 (1983).
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"honest debtor" analysis is attractive because it encapsulates the court's
implicit moral inquiry.
This is the true pattern of the broad good faith cases. The moral
inquiry that drives the broad good faith courts throws the debtor's
history open to scrutiny, even though the Code does not support such an
examination. The reason that courts are offended by the attempt to
discharge what would be nondischargeable in Chapter 7 is that the
debtor seems to be avoiding her just deserts: The· idea that the debtor
abuses the spirit of the Code by seeking a Chapter 13 discharge follows
the same line of reasoning: the debtor seeks to avoid her punishment by
the subtle trickery of complying with the statute. 195 For this reason the
courts often cannot contain their outrage at the conduct of the debtor or
at the facts giving rise to liability.
From the beginning of its deliberations, a broad good faith court
makes a moral inquiry. As previously noted, what characterizes the
broad good faith inquiry is the unwillingness to read § 1325(a)(3)
literally. Thus, courts have left the realm of law altogether. By
focussing on the moral status of the debtor, the courts have stopped
interpreting "good faith'' in Chapter 13 as a concept in the law rooted in
a le~al text, and have dropped into the metaphysical world of morality.196

195. Most of the broad good faith courts imply by their actions that it is an unfair
manipulation of the use of Chapter 13 to discharge liability that the court does not
believe should be discharged. A few courts, however, have explicitly stated that
compliance with the formalities of Chapter 13 constitutes manipulation ofthe statute. See
Shell Oil Co. v. Waldron (In re Waldron), 785 F.2d 936, 941 (11th Cir. 1986) ("Good
faith or basic honesty is the very antithesis of attempting to circumvent a legal obligation
through a technicality of the law."); In re Davis, 68 B.R. 205,217 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1986) (quoting with approval, In re Waldron, 785 F.2d at 941). See also In re Carver,
110 B.R. 305, 308 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990), in which the court makes the incredible
admission that: "The courts have been guided by subjective, rather than legislative,
considerations in defining the 'spirit and purpose' of Chapter 13, even at the expense of
the express provisions of the Code."
196. The twentieth century has produced successive waves of schools of textual
interpretation.
_These schools disagree at virtually every point in their
Weltanschauungen. They would all agree, however, that the critical point in a text is the
point at which the text seems to lose control of itself and spiral out of control of its
stated intention. Among the leading lights in the field of text studies are the psychiatrist
Sigmund Freud, the cultural anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss and the literary theorist
Jacques Derrida. Freud identified the critical point as follows:
There is often a passage in even the most thoroughly interpreted dream which
has to be left obscure.... [A]t that point there is a tangle of dream-thoughts
which cannot be unraveled and which moreover adds nothing to our
knowledge of the content of the dream. This is the dream's navel, the spot
where it reaches down into the unknown. The dream-thoughts . . . cannot . . .
have any definite endings; they are bound to branch out in every direction into
the intricate network of our world of thought.
·
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Not only is the language of the courts moral, but so is their very
orientation. When the courts eschew an examination of objective
behavior and focus instead on internal, unknowable motivation, they
abandon the mandate of the law.
The distinction between law and moral inquiry is complex, but may
be simply summarized. H.L.A. Hart presents the traditional distinction
between law and morality as follows:
The most famous attempt to convey in summary fashion their essential
difference is the theory which asserts that, while legal rules only require
'external' behavior and are indifferent to the motives, intentions, or other
'internal' accompaniments of conduct, morals on the other hand do not require

5 THE STANDARD EDmON OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND
FREUD 525 (James Strachey ed., 1959). Levi-Strauss, describing the "key myth" upon
which to base his structural analysis of myth, stated, ''the key myth is interesting not
because it is typical, but rather because of its irregular position within the group. It so
happens that this particular myth raises problems of interpretation that are especially
likely to stimulate reflection." 1 CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, INTRODUCTION TO A SCIENCE
OF MYTHOLOGY: THE RAW AND THE COOKED 2 (John & Doreen Weightman trans.,
Harper & Row 1969). Derrida used "metaphor" as an example of a site at which a text
unravels:
Since it marks the movement or the detour in which sense [meaning] may
seem to launch out by itself, unloosed from the very object to which it
nevertheless is pointed, from the truth which brings it into harmony with its
referent, metaphor may set off an errant semantics. The sense of a noun,
instead of designating the thing which the noun should normally designate,
goes elsewhere.
Jacques Derrida, White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy, 6 NEW
LITERARY HISTORY 5, 41 (1974). It appears that the precedential authority cited in a
legal opinion functions the same way as a metaphor, by opening the text to the extratextual. For Freud, Levi-Strauss, Derrida, and all of the text scientists, these caesurae
are the point at which a text reveals its true self.
Text science by any name (structuralism, deconstruction, grammatology, or
anthropoetics) has earned a deservedly bad reputation in legal studies. As a result, it
would not be proper to insist too strenuously that the Code and the cases interpreting it
are one ''text," nor that "good faith" "deconstructs" the Bankruptcy Code. Yet the
similarity between the holes in the texts of which Freud, Levi-Strauss and Derrida speak,
and the hole punched by the broad good faith courts is suggestive. Even the most
traditional of readers must admit that some of the "good faith" cases reach conclusions
which, by studying the statute, are unpredictable. Because these cases are unpredictable,
they pierce a hole in the Code, introducing unpredictability and incoherence into a text
which was designed to enhance predictability and establish authority. Are the "good
faith" cases the umbilicus which reveals the Code's own true self? Regrettably, this
inquiry must await a subsequent opportunity for further discussion.
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any specific external actions but only a good will or proper intentions or
motive. 197

Law focuses primarily on conduct, and secondarily on motivation.
Morality places primary weight on motivation, and secondary weight on
objective conduct.
·
This dichotomy is crystal clear in two major Western religious
systems. In Judaism, a moral and a legal system coexist in the two parts
of the halachah. 198 One part of the halachah may be called law; it
concerns objective conduct. The other part might be called moral. The
Yorn K.ippur199 liturgy reflects this latter portion. On Yorn K.ippur,
Jews atone not only for intentional and knowing transgressions of Jewish
law, but also, "[f]or the sin which [they] have sinned ... without
knowledge; [and] ... for the sin that [they] have sinned ... through
confusion of the heart."200 These phrases imply that the objective
conduct may be set aside, so that the penitent can be judged on his
intention. The theme can also be found throughout the Talmud:
"R[abbi] Nahman bar Issac said: A transgression performed with a good
motive is better than a precept [mitzvah or commandment] performed for
an ulterior motive."201 Moreover, "[t]he one who performs numerous
precepts and the one who performs only a few have equal merit,

197. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 168 (1st ed., 1961). Ofcourse, Professor
Hart only cites this summary distinction in order to destroy it. Professor Hart claims that
the distinction is erroneous; he proceeds to derive four "cardinal related features" which
point out the true distinctions. Id. at 169-176. Hart's real objection to the general
distinction quoted here is apparently that it fails to acknowledge that law, too, is
concerned with motivation. In this observation, he is obviously correct; nonetheless, this
objection does not completely invalidate the distinction quoted. I would like to believe
that Professor Hart would agree with me that law is concerned primarily with objective
conduct and only secondarily with intention, whereas morality reverses the level of
priority.
198. Halachah generally means, ''The Way," and refers to the combined sources of
Jewish Law. The code of Jewish law includes commandments from the Bible, as well
as legal rulings from the Mishna (a first compendium of rabbinic interpretations and
amplifications of the law) and the Talmud (a second compendium). Halachah also
includes contemporary and current rulings and interpretations, more or less through
present day. See RABBI HAYIM HALEVY DoNIN, To BE A JEW 29 (1972).
199. "Yorn Kippur" is the "Day of Atonement," in which Jews confess their
transgressions to God and request forgiveness. One can seek only divine forgiveness on
Yorn Kippur; any transgressions against one's fellows must be addressed separately. The
quoted portion of the liturgy, infra note 200, at 360-361, and accompanying text,
highlights the similarity of the focus on intention in a context in which the standard of
behavior is moral more than it is ethical (i.e., relating to the relationships with God
rather than the relationship between persons).
200. THE COMPLETE ARTSCROLL MACHZOR: YOM KIPPUR 360,361 (1992).
201. Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Nazir 23b, quoted in THE BOOK OF LEGENDS 460
(William G. Braude trans., Hayim Nahman Bialik & Yehoshua Hana Ravnitzky eds.,
1992).
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provided the heart is directed toward Heaven. "202 Thus, in this moral
system, internal and subjective intention is of primary concern, while
compliance with the law is of secondary importance.
The pre-eminence of. internal motivation over external, objective
actions is even more clear in Christianity. This clarity arises, in part, out
of Christianity's historical dismissal of Jewish law. This pre-eminence
is also presented starkly in the New Testament through its insistence that
observance of the law is insufficient: "Woe unto you, scribes and
Pharisees, hypocrites! For ye pay tithe of mint and anise and cumin, and
have omitted the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy and
faith: these ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone. " 203 The internal motivations matter in this moral system, as the
following passages illustrate: "Thou blind Pharisee, cleanse first that
which is within the cup and platter, that the outside of them may be
clean also ..." 204 "Even so ye also outwardly appear righteous unto
men, but within ye are full of hypocrisy and iniquity."205 Again,
motivation is the primary concern, while conduct is only secondary. The
foregoing complaints indict technical observance of the law as sly
attempts to avoid moral judgment.

B.

The Power of the Court of Equity

The moral inquiry undertaken by the broad good faith courts is not
completely without precedent in common law jurisprudence. Bankruptcy
courts--particularly the broad good faith courts-are fond of justifying
their expansive inquiry with the broad powers that can be executed by
a court of equity. Although bankruptcy evolved from the law merchant,206 · there is no doubt that it arrived in the common law as a
creature of equity. The Chancery courts maintained original jurisdiction
over statutory bankruptcy in England.207 The receivership in equity

202. Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Berachot 5b, quoted in THE BOOK OF LEGENDS
460 (William G. Braude trans., Hayim Nahman Bialik & Yehoshua Hana Ravnitzky eds.,
1992).
203. Matthew 23:25.
204. Id.
205. Matthew 23:28.
206. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 63 (1973).
207. 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, HISTORYOFENGLISHLAW470-478 (A.L. Goodhart
et al. eds., 4th ed., 1956).
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approximated bankruptcy protection (at least for the creditors) before the
advent of comprehensive bankruptcy codes.208
Equity and equitable remedies carry a heavy load of historical
baggage. One legacy is a certain informality, an unwillingness either to
state or to be bound by "elements" of a cause of action: "[T]he
substantive rules of equity were made in response either to unduly rigid
legal rules, or to their entire inadequacy . . . In the equity court it· did
not matter whether the facts fitted some established form; relief would
be given on the chancellor's sense of need and justice."209 Another
legacy is the centrality of the judge and the reliance on the judge's
idiosyncratic decision: "[R]elief would be given on the chancellor's
sense of need and justice . . . . He decided the case himself, and he
compelled what the law courts would not even permit-the testimony of
the actual parties."210 The chancellor's remedies were also more
powerful than those of his colleagues in the law courts,211 making him
even more central in the system than a judge in a court of law.
A final legacy looms quite large for present considerations, The
equity system was not defined just by what it was not--not formal, not
legal--but also by its peculiar focus. The kernel of a chancery question
was moral. Equity courts use rules and equitable maxims,212 but "in
each case the substantive rules were purportedly based on higher. moral
principle."213 A chancery court might consider the petitioner's "clean
hands," and "unclean hands may be any sort of conduct that equity
considers unethical, even if that conduct is perfectly legal."214
Thus, equity can be characterized as informal, idiosyncratic, and
moral. It is certainly not surprising that an area of law descended from
equity might contain traces of these elements. Nor is it particularly

208. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 24 (1973).
209. Id. at 25.
210. Id.
211. Professor Dobbs categorizes these remedies as coercive, restitutionary and
declaratory. Id. It is interesting to consider how much of the modem practice of law
relies on equitable remedies. In the author's experience, little civil litigation proceeds
without the use of equitable remedies such as injunction and restitution; equally common
is the use of measures of"good faith," or "clean hands." Perhaps the fusion of Law and
Equity was a merger, but it often seems much more like a hostile ~akeover, with Law
being the losing party.
212. A few of the maxims are cited by Professor Dobbs. Id. at 44 n.24, 45 n.24.
For the purpose of this article's analysis, some of the more interesting maxims are: "He
who comes into equity must come with clean hands; ... Equitable remedies are given
as a matter of grace or discretion, not of right; . . . Equity acts in personam, not in rem."
Id. (citing G. KEETON, INTRODUCTION To EQUITY 116 (5th ed. 1961)).
213. Id. at 25.
214. Id. at 46.
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surpnsmg that an equity court's analysis should take on a moral
dimension.
A moral dimension, however, differs from a moral inquiry. The moral
inquiry undertaken by the broad good faith courts conflicts strongly with
the purposes of both a system of law and a code of law. This conflict
is never more evident than when we examine the purpose of commercial
law and the function of the Code.
C.

Predictability and the Code .

We have examined rather exhaustively one area of the commercial
law: Bankruptcy's Chapter 13. To further understand the problem of
moral inquiry in bankruptcy courts, it is necessary to examine the
purpose of commercial law and the function of a code.
A principal requirement for an efficient system of commerce is
predictability. Merchants who are distant from one another must be able
to predict each other's present and future conduct. For that reason, cases
in commercial law are replete with allusion to certainty as "a prime
objective,"215 an "overriding consideration,"216 or at least as a matter
of high importance.217 Certainty has been a matter of cardinal importance in commercial law since the founding of the republic.218 The
objective of the commercial code was to unify the commercial law to
further promote certainty and predictability.219
Certainty is of equal concern in the Bankruptcy Code. The Code's
provisions choreograph a complex dance of debtor, creditor and court,
each of whom must know what to expect of the other dancers in the

215. Lakeside Bride & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co. Inc., 445 U.S. 907,
911 (1980) (J. White) (commenting on "commercial relations in which certainty ofresult
is a prime objective").
216. Dixilyn Drilling Corp. v. Crescent Towing and Salvage Co., 372 U.S. 697,698,
699 (1963) (J. Harlan, concurring) (noting that "[c]ertainty in the law governing
commercial transactions ... is an overriding consideration ....").
217. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 615 (1951) (J. Frankfurter, dissenting)
(commenting on "the field of commercial law--where certainty is of high importance").
218. Sony Corp. of America v. Banlc One, 85 F.3d 131, 145 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating,
in .the dissent, which is an excellent discussion of certainty in commercial law, that
"[t]he cardinal principle of certainty has been the same in commercial law for more than
200 years.").
219. FSLIC v. Kralj, 968 F.2d 500, 508 (5th Cir. 1992); Federal Ins. Co. v. NCNB
Nat. Banlc ofN.C., 958 F.2d 1544, 1551 (11th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he UCC has the objective
of promoting certainty and predictability in commercial transactions.").

485

future. Bankruptcy courts insist that "certainty and finality" are goals of
the Code.220 One case characterizes bankrugtcy as an area in which
the need for certainty is "particularly acute." 21 Of course, given their
mutual parent, the law merchant, it is not surprising that commercial law
and bankruptcy share this objective. Nor is the primacy of certainty and
predictability limited to commercial law. One opinion emphasized that
"in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be
settled than that it be settled right."222
Bankruptcy and commercial law share another characteristic: their
means for achieving predictability. In bankruptcy law, predictability is
accomplished primarily through formal codification. The purpose of a
codification is the promotion of both uniformity and certainty.223
Whether the "Codes" appearing in American law are "true" codes, is a
subject of some academic debate. 224 However, the Bankruptcy Code
certainly fits the definition of code as a compendium of law, "devising
and shaping 'a coherent body of new or renovated rules' within a whole
aimed at 'instituting or reviewing a· legal order. "'225 Two American
220. Pioneer Inv. Services Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380,
388 (1993) (citing ''the Bankruptcy Code's goals of certainty and finality"); Allred v.
Kennerley (In re Kennerley), 995 F.2d 145, 148 (9th Cir. 1993) (speaking of"the need
for certainty in determining which claims are and are not discharged"); Nelson Co. v.
Counsel for the Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Nelson Co.) 959 F.2d
1260, 1266 (3rd. Cir. 1992) (noting certainty as one driving force in its decision).
·
221. In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 944 F.2d 164, 166, 167 (3rd Cir. 1991)
(beginning its analysis with the "proposition that in the context of bankruptcy 'the need
for finality and certainty is especially acute."' (quoting Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 938
F.2d 420,425 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Schneiderman, 940 F.2d
911, 914 (3d Cir. 1991))).
222. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). See also Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 1767 (1995) (Rhenquist,
C.J., dissenting).
223. See Jean Louis Bergel, Principal Fea'tUres and Methods ofCodification, 48 LA.
L. REV. 1073, 1073 (1988) ("A code is ... characterized by two fundamental functions:
it gathers together written rules of law and it regulates different fields of law.").
224. Professor Bergel distinguishes between ''true" or substantive codifications and
"merely formal" codifications. Id. at 1076, 1077. Not surprisingly, this professor from
the Universite de Droite, d'Economie et des Sciences d'Aix'Marseille III, finds that
French codes are true codes and the American codes are not. On the one hand, he is
undoubtedly right that "codes" such as the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code or the
Georgia Civil Code "strive[ ] only to succeed in regrouping and classifying existing
texts." Id. at. l 097. On the other hand, the purposes of the Bankruptcy and Commercial
Codes meet the ''main goal of substantive or true codification[:] to achieve a material
and systemic structure of the law". Id.
225. Id. at 1077 (citing 1 G. CORNU, DROIT CIVIL, INTRODUCTION--LES
PERSONNEs--LES BIENS, no. 222 (2nd ed. 1985)). Professor Bergel's objection to the
common law codes seems to be two-folded. First, that they were not animated by a
"political and ideological impulse," are not therefore ''the elaboration of a particular
spirit," and thus cannot be true codes. Id. at 1077-1078. One wonders how any code
not animated by a French emperor could meet this objection. Second, he objects that
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scholars explain the rationale behind codification: "[I]f the law is put
into a code (a well drafted one, of course) then its generally precise text
will greatly reduce uncertainty, enhance predictability, and diminish the
volume of legal disputes. ,;226 In essence, these writers argue that the
code must be authoritative. While this statement specifically referred to
the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, it could apply equally to
the creation of the Bankruptcy Code.227
Scholars appear to agree uniformly that the purpose of a code is to
ensure predictability. The writers on codes and codification agree that
much of the focus is on the layman ~ ability to predict the outcome of
his actions.
[T]he primary function of the codes . . . is not to guide the resolution of
disputed cases by the courts, but to guide the daily life of honest citizens-to
provide the rules on which the citizen can safely rely in the conduct of his
affairs, whether in his family, or his place of employment or business, or in his
relations with neighbors. It is precisely in performing this function that the
general principles, standards rules and concepts of the code, can, despite Justice
Holmes, "decide" a vast number of "concrete cases" in the sense of indicating
what the citizen needs to do. 228

Put more succinctly, a code should provide "an organized system of
general rules which will be easy to discover so that from these rules,
the common law codes do not attempt a codification of the entire body of civil law, but
instead tend to be confined either to particular substantive areas or to "strive[ ] merely
to ... regroup and reclassify" existing statutes. Id. at 1097. This objection receives
further support in Dennis Tallon, Civil and Commercial Law, in 8 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF COMP. L. 47-56 (Konrad Zweigert ed., 1983). My colleagues from Code countries
share this view of a code as an all-encompassing umbrella and, therefore, find codes
such as the Bankruptcy Code to be curiously limited.
226.
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERTS. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 20 (2d ed. 1980).
227. There are obviously differences between the circum~tances which led to the
creation of the Bankruptcy Code and the Uniform Commercial Code. The UCC had to
unify a field in which each state had already established a corpus of existing law. The
Bankruptcy Code essentially defined its field and then preempted any competitor (with
assistance from the Constitution and Congress). Nevertheless, it can hardly be doubted
that Professors White and . Summers voice the intentions that animated not just the
drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code, but also the Bankruptcy Code and its
predecessors.
228. Geoffrey Sawyer, The Western Conception of Law, in 2 INT'L ENCYLOPEDIA
OF COMP. L. 32 (Rene David ed., 1983) (emphasis in original). The phrase "honest
citizen" is both inexplicable and tantalizing. It is inexplicable because even Napoleonic
Code countries have laws which govern the actions of the dishonest citizens. A civil
code should therefore cover both. It is tantalizing in light of the discussion in the text
of the parthenogenesis of the term ''honest debtor."
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through an easy process, judges and citizens may deduce the manner in
which this or that practical difficulty must be solved."229
In what sense do the broad good faith courts fulfill the twin necessities of authority and predictability? When the courts ignore the plain
meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, they make the Code unreliable
because the statutory words no longer mean what they appear to mean.
Through idiosyncratic and unpredictable interpretations of Code
language, broad good faith courts make the Code unpredictable as well.
Even the courts complain about the confusion of opinions on "good
faith."230 How well are these courts-the majority of Chapter 13
courts--serving the Code and the law?

V.

GOOD FAITH,

BAD LAW

The author believes that the primary problem with the broad good
faith analysis is that it imports a moral inquiry into the Bankruptcy
Code. This article, however, should not be read to criticize any moral
or religious view. The author does not intend to denigrate either of the
moral systems previously mentioned. Nor does the author mean to
encourage the reprehensible view that personal morality and the practice
of law are separate disciplines, or that ethics is merely a course taught
in law school. To the contrary, the author believes that a person cannot
properly practice law without a strong sense of personal morality
informing her actions.
Moral and legal systems, nevertheless, have differing methodologies
and differing ends. Law and morality may be related-we are best
advised to leave the exact definition of that relationship to moral
scholars-but they are distinctly separate.231 For this reason, the

229. Jean Louis Bergel, Principal Features and Methods of Codification, 48 LA. L.
REV. at 1081 (1988).
230. In re Heard, 6 B.R. 876 (Bankr. W.D. Ken. 1980) (noting a confusion of
opinions); In re Jones, 119 B.R. 996 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990) (noting an infinity of
opinions); Public Fin. Corp. v. Freeman, 712 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1983) (referring to the
issue as "unsettled").
231. One further example demonstrates how distinct law and morality are as
systems. As discussed supra, notes 196-205 and accompanying text, moral systems
focus on intention. In law, intention is an element of many causes of action. However,
two points must be observed: First, in both criminal and civil contexts, the malfeasor
is judged principally upon his objectively determinable conduct. Perhaps this is because
intent may be inferred but is objectively unknowable, whereas conduct can be proven.
Second, even where intention or scienter is an element of a cause of action, it can only
be proven by inference or indirect evidence. Many jury instructions on intention
explicitly permit the jury to infer that "a person intends the natural and probable
consequences" of his actions because intent can never be directly known. 1 EowARD D.
DEVTIT, ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE INSTRUCTIONS§ 17.07 (4th ed. 1992). In a
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importation of external inquiries into an objective legal system creates
an insupportable tension that disrupts and distorts the law.
The disruption manifests itself in several ways. The principal result
of the tension is that the interpretation of the statute, as read by the
majority of courts, becomes unpredictable, and therefore less than
authoritative. However, there are other problems. The broad good faith
courts, in re-writing the statute, violate the Constitutional separation of
powers. Moreover, in undertaking a moral analysis, the courts often
adopt informal procedures which threaten due process. The broad good
faith movement creates a class of "bad debtors" who are a priori
presumed undeserving of Code protection, irrespective of what is stated
in the statute. Although there is insufficient space to examine these
problems in detail, a few words should be said about each.
The author previously noted the importance of predictability in
commercial law and in bankruptcy law in particular. The importation of
the moral inquiry into the Bankruptcy Code makes the outcome of the
"good faith" analysis unpredictable in practice. A debtor must guess
what a court will do, given his particular jurisdiction and a particular
judge. If the debtor has the misfortune of being assigned to a broad
good faith court, the debtor is unable to anticipate how the bankruptcy
judge will view the debtor and her particular history. The same conduct
which will constitute good faith in one court will cause a plan to be
denied for "bad faith" in another. Because the broad good faith cases
recognize no anchoring text or principle, the Code and the cases provide
almost no practical guidance as to what might occur once the debtor files
his petition in Chapter 13.232 For debtors concerned with their own

moral system, either the standards of conduct are metaphysical or the Judge is perfect
and omniscient. In either case, intent is presumed to be knowable. Moral judgements
about a person's character tend to be absolute ("dishonest," "impenitent," etc.), as though
these judgements reach beyond conduct, delving into a person's true essence. Moreover,
in a moral system, the standards of evidence tend to be informal (one assumes that the
Judge can, in fact, hear inadmissible evidence and still set it aside while coming to a
judgment) because the Judge is omniscient. Interestingly, this informality of procedure
is picked up by the broad good faith courts, although presumably the bankruptcy court
judges claim somewhat less perfection than their omnipotent Colleague. Thus, a
confusion over which system empowers a judge could easily result in either the
judgement of a person's moral essence rather than their conduct, or in a willingness to
rely on less formal procedures once the moral truth is deemed "obvious," rather than rely
on statutory authority.
232. Pity the poor bankruptcy lawyer who has to represent a debtor with a
checkered past! Not only does the practitioner have conflicting ethical duties to the
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immediate problems, the problem of unpredictability looms even larger
than the jurisprudential problems that will subsequently be discussed.
For debtors, the consumers and beneficiaries of the Code, the greatest
concern is the practical and immediate question: How will I be treated?
However, the concern about predictability is not merely parochial. It
concerns all legal systems and all cultures:
At the root of everyday life in any society there must necessarily be some
patterns of habitual conduct followed by the members, providing a basis upon
which one member will be able to predict how another is likely to behave under
given circumstances and how his own actions will be received. 233

Certainty and predictability must be the essence of a legal system. Yet
a debtor in a Chapter 13 can have little certainty about how a court will
behave or how her own actions will be received.
There are jurisprudential -problems which must also be noted. First,
consider the question of the courts rewriting the statute. The statute
states that "good faith" relates to proposal of a plan; the broad good
faith courts ignore this directive. A few courts point out that a broad
good faith reading infringes on Congressional prerogatives.234 This
writer could find no response by the broad good faith courts to that
charge. But it is not a criticism to be ignored. When the courts re-write
legislation, they violate the separation of powers, which is a principal
foundation of our constitutional system. The recognition that courts
could interpret but not rewrite statutes primarily dawned with Marbury
v. Madison. 235 In that case, Chief Justice Marshall determined that the
courts should not entertain political questions. 236 There has been great
debate over what constitutes a political questions, but there is little
debate over the proposition that political.questions include all matters on
which Congress has spoken constitutionally.237 The broad good faith
courts showcase the danger inherent in judicial encroachment. The
courts' re-writing of the statute to avoid ends they abhor may seem
harmless when the imported values are moral. Yet, if courts can give
themselves moral license to ignore the plain meaning of a statute, what
prevents them from similarly licensing themselves to import terms

estate and to the client, but she cannot predict which factors the court will use to judge
the plan she has assisted the client in drafting. Must the lawyer notify her malpractice
carrier each time she files a Chapter 13 plan?
. 233. SIMON ROBERTS, ORDER AND DISPUTE: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 25 (1979).
234. See discussion supra notes 94, 95.
235. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
236. Id.
237. See CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF TIIE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS,
§ 14 (3d ed. 1976).
·
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contrary to the Constitution, or contrary to the common law tradition, or
contrary to democratic values?238
Most of the courts remain ignorant of the problem or ignore it. Some
opinions, however, clarify that in rewriting the statute, the broad good
faith courts ignore the clear signals of the Supreme Court239 and usurp
legislative prerogative.240 One court cautions: "Without some definition, an exercise of discretion could be arbitrary and an abuse."241
Occasionally, the broad good faith courts recognize the limits as they
trample them, as exemplified by the following passage: "The courts have
been guided by subjective, rather than legislative, considerations in
defining the 'spirit and purpose' of Chapter 13, even at the expense of
the express provisions of the Code."24 Chillingly, many courts are
shameless in announcing their intent to ignore the plain words of the
statute: "A statute should not be applied strictly in accord with its literal

238. This must be acknowledged as a particularly painful epiphany to those of us
who grew up cheering the aggressive activism of the Warren Court. The Warren Court
seemed to seek out injustice and strike it down, acting heroically in areas in which the
legislature seemed incapable of acting. The decisions of the broad good faith courts
illustrate why judicial activism creates systemic legal problems. When courts have no
anchor to restrain them, they may act in unpredictable and ultimately destructive ways.
The results of judicial activism may fit our own individual agendas. These results,
. however, may also undermine our agendas in two different ways. First, the judicial
activists may serve an agenda contrary to our own. Second, and more importantly,
judicial activism weakens the judicial system by subjecting the law to the kinds of
pressures which bend and tear the fabric of the law. The damage done to the legal
system as a whole may be catastrophic when courts refuse to recognize any external
standard (e.g., a statute or the Constitution) to anchor their decisions. What would
happen, for example, if a majority of courts adopted the "God's law over man's law"
argument advanced in some areas of heated cultural debate? If courts may ignore or
distort legal principles which result in (for them) unconscionable ends, then what
predictability and what principles would long survive?
239. See cases cited supra note 95. Query: if the Supreme Court is not supreme,
what is it?
240. The Supreme Court, presumably the ultimate judicial branch arbiter of the
issue, clearly considers this to be legislative prerogative. See, e.g. Taylor v. Freeland
& Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 644, 645 (1992) (declining to read into a section of the Code.
provisions to limit bad faith claims, and stating: "To the extent that [the Code sections]
do not [provide the necessary limitations], Congress may enact comparable provisions
to address the difficulties that [the creditor] predicts will follow our decision. We have
no authority to limit the application [of the statute.]"). See also cases cited supra note
95.
241. In re Farley, 114 B.R 711, 713 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990).
242. In re Carver, 110 B.R 305, 308 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio, 1990).
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meaning where to do so would pervert its manifest meaning."243 It is
difficult to view this statement as justification for anything less than the
"arbitrary" and "abusive" actions warned of above.244
A related jurisprudential problem with the broad good faith courts is
that when they import the moral elements of the equitable inquiry, they
seem also to import the informal procedures of the old courts of equity.
In Neufeld v. Freeman, for example, the Fourth Circuit based its "lack
of good faith" holding on nondischargeability. 245 This was not a
nondischargeability determination that had been adjudicated by a court:
the claims were only "arguably ... render[ed] ... nondischargeable in
a Chapter 7 case. " 246 The court, nevertheless, stated that no formal
finding ever needed to be made:
Of course the issue of dischargeability in Chapter 7 need not, and cannot, be
litigated to conclusion in every Chapter 13 confirmation proceeding. Where
significant claims involve conduct that would otherwise raise serious Chapter
7 dischargeability issues, however, the quality of that conduct is part of the
''totality of circumstances" which must be weigl!ed, with other factors, in
assessing the debtor's good faith under chapter 13.247

Nor did the burden of proof need to be as high as it would need to be
elsewhere:
If the court discovers unmistakable manifestations of bad faith ... confirmation
must be denied. Unmistakable manifestations of bad faith need not be based
upon a finding of actual fraud requiring proof of malice, scienter or an intent
to defraud. We simply require that the bankruptcy courts preserve the integrity
of the bankruptcy process by refusing to condone its abuse.248

Thus a debtor's conduct may be determined nondischargeable without
an opportunity for the kind of hearing to which, were she in Chapter 7,
she would be entitled. Moreover, this determination may be made on
minimal proof, insufficient to support an actual finding. This is the kind
of informal procedure which the old courts of equity might condone; in
American jurisprudence, this informality treads close to a denial of due
process.
The reader may dismiss these concerns as mere glitches in a complex
system that requires a little fine-tuning. We may wish to trust the
system of justice not to allow the courts to wander too far astray.

243. In re Adamo, 619.F.2d 216, 222 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom.
Williams v. New York Higher Educ. Services, 449 U.S. 843 (1980); see also In re
Meltzer, 11 B.R. 624, 627 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1981) (citing In re Adamo with approval).
244. See discussion supra notes 237-239 and accompanying text.
245. 794 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1986).
246. Id. at 151.
247. Id. at 153.
248. Id.
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Perhaps the problems of the violation of separation cif powers and denial
of due process are minor issues, small monsters to be dealt with when
they have grown larger and more imminent. For one particular group of
debtors, however, the problems associated with the broad good faith
inquiry are huge and present. This is the undefined class who will be
found to be ''undeserving" of the_ discharge offered by Chapter 13. The
broad good faith analysis threatens to create a class of disfavored
debtors whose experience in bankruptcy court is more likely to be
unpleasant than other debtors in similar economic situations. Courts are
creating a class of bad debtors who do not "deserve" bankruptcy
protection, by labeling them "dishonest debtors" or merely ''undeserving." This has to be of concern to any debtor with a blemished prebankruptcy history. Professionals who seek protection in bankruptcy
should be particularly concerned. If the broad good faith courts are
going to judge any debtor harshly, who better deserves their wrath than
the professional who seeks to discharge malpractice liability by invoking
the protection of Chapter 13? After all, these are debtors whom the
bankruptcy courts have already been treating with increased scrutiny,249
and who may choose Chapter 13 to discharge what would not be
dischargeable in Chapter 7. To the problems of unpredictability,
separation of powers, denial of due process, add fairness: Is it fair for
courts to create a suspect class of debtors without statutory or legislative
authority?
This article does not argue that the broad good faith courts err in their
concerns about the proper qualifications for a Chapter 13 action. One
may reasonably argue that professionals do not deserve protection in
bankruptcy. The issue of the discharge of nondischargeable debts can
also be debated. The use of the Code by "dishonest debtors" certainly
needs to be debated and must be resolved. These are legitimate concerns
of educated, intelligent and well meaning jurists. These concerns should
be aired and debated, both in academic journals and in Congress.
The problem with the broad good faith courts is not their concern but
their conduct. These courts should consider the likely results of their
actions. A law that is unpredictable will be ignored. Courts and
commentators already complain about the number of unacceptable plans
presented. But who can determine what the rule is when every court has

249.

See Elbein, supra note 3.
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its own? Moreover, the proper advice to a debtor with a questionable
past may be to file under Chapter 7 in order to avoid the unpredictable
results of the good faith analysis. The ultimate burden of the unpredictability will thus be borne by the creditors, who by definition would
receive less under Chapter 7 than under Chapter 13250 and would,
therefore, be burdened by additional Chapter 7 filings.
The effects of the unpredictability inherent in the broad good faith
analysis may reach far beyond Chapter 13. This unbounded analysis
threatens to tear the text of the Bankruptcy Code open to the personal
interpretation of an individual judge who recognizes no limits on his
interpretative discretion. The hole in the Code, having been worked
open, may fray and tear with the interjection of the courts' idiosyncratic
interpretations until "good faith" truly means nothing. It is not
unreasonable to believe that this cancer could easily spread to Chapter
11 's "good faith" requirement (if it is not already working there in the
guise of a "good faith filing requirement"). Nor is there any reason to
believe that this approach must be limited to the bounds of the Code.
If bankruptcy courts can ignore both the clear words of the statute and
the mandate of the Supreme Court, then why not ignore the troublesome
wording of banking statutes, or the criminal law, or even amendments
to the Constitution? What body of law can survive the reinterpretation
of its major provisions in ways not restrained by anything beyond the
courts' own idiosyncratic values? Whatever meaning Congress intended
for "good faith," Congress surely did not intend to license an undermining of the authority of the Bankruptcy Code.
Courts may legitimately concern themselves with morality and law.
In doing so, however, they should remember the injunction of the
greatest proponent and expositor of the moral law. Immanuel Kant
derived the following supreme principle for ethical conduct: "Act on a
maxim the ends of which are such as it might be a universal law for
everyone to have."251 That is: Act in ways which, if adopted by all of
society, would cause no societal harm; avoid acting in ways which, if
adopted by all, would damage society.
In examining "good faith" in Chapter 13, we have seen the results of
defying Kant's categorical imperative. When courts fail to recognize the
plain meaning of a statute as a restraint, and instead rely on their own

250. This is the "definition" of§ 1325(a)(4), which requires that the creditor receive
"not less than the amount that would be paid ... under chapter 7." 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(a)(4) (1994).
251. hnmanuel Kant, Preface and Introduction to the Metaphysics of Ethics
(Thomas Kingsmill Abbott trans.), in 42 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 373
(Robert Maynard Hutchinson et al. eds., 1952).
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moral values, they render the Code unpredictable· and undermine its
authority. However, the damage is not irreparable. Courts can act in a
manner which "might become a universal law," the manner that is
required by our legal system. Bankruptcy courts must recognize the
plain meaning of the Code as a restraint on their good faith activism.
Only in this manner, can these courts repair the hole already worn into
the integrity of the Code, providing much needed certainty, equality, and
predictability.
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